Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments by Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff
Global Current Account Imbalances
and Exchange Rate Adjustments
THIS IS THE third in a series of papers we have written over the past ﬁve years
about the growing U.S. current account deﬁcit and the potentially sharp ex-
change rate movements any future adjustment toward current account bal-
ance might imply.
1 The problem has hardly gone away in those ﬁve years.
Indeed, the U.S. current account deﬁcit today is running at around 6 per-
cent of GDP, an all-time record. Incredibly, the U.S. deﬁcit now soaks up
about 75 percent of the combined current account surpluses of Germany,
Japan, China, and all the world’s other surplus countries.
2 To balance its
current account simply through higher exports, the United States would
have to increase export revenue by a staggering 58 percent over 2004 levels.
And, as we argue in this paper, the speed at which the U.S. current account
ultimately returns toward balance, the triggers that drive that adjustment,
and the way in which the burden of adjustment is allocated across Europe
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1. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a, 2004). From an accounting perspective, a country’s
current account balance essentially adds net interest and dividend payments to its trade bal-
ance. As we discuss below, the United States presently receives about the same amount of in-
come on its foreign assets as it pays out to foreign creditors. Hence, for the United States (and
indeed many countries), the current account balance and the trade balance are quantitatively
very similar. As we later emphasize, however, the current account does not include capital
gains and losses on existing wealth. Thus the overall change in a country’s net foreign asset
position can, in principle, be less than or greater than its current account deﬁcit or surplus.
2. Calculated from the World Economic Outlook database of the International Monetary
Fund, using current account data from 2004.and Asia all have enormous implications for global exchange rates. Each
scenario for returning to balance poses, in turn, its own risks to ﬁnancial
markets and to general economic stability.
Our assessment is that the risks of collateral damage—beyond the risks
to exchange rate stability—have grown substantially over the ﬁve years
since our ﬁrst research paper on the topic, partly because the U.S. current
account deﬁcit itself has grown, but mainly because of a mix of other fac-
tors. These include, not least, the stunningly low U.S. personal saving rate
(which, driven by unsustainable rates of housing appreciation and record
low interest rates, fell to 1 percent of disposable personal income in 2004).
But additional major risks are posed by the sharp deterioration in the U.S.
federal government’s ﬁscal trajectory since 2000, rising energy prices, and
the fact that the United States has become increasingly dependent on Asian
central banks and politically unstable oil producers to ﬁnance its deﬁcits.
To these vulnerabilities must be added Europe’s conspicuously inﬂexible
economy, Japan’s continuing dependence on export-driven growth, the sus-
ceptibility of emerging markets to any kind of global ﬁnancial volatility,
and the fact that, increasingly, the counterparties in international asset
transactions are insurance companies, hedge funds, and other relatively
unregulated nonbank ﬁnancial entities. Perhaps above all, geopolitical
risks and the threat of international terror have risen markedly since Sep-
tember 2001, confronting the United States with open-ended long-term
costs for ﬁnancing wars and homeland security.
True, if some shock (such as a rise in foreign demand for U.S. exports)
were to close up these global imbalances quickly without exposing any con-
comitant weaknesses, the damage might well be contained to exchange rates
and to the collapse of a few large banks and ﬁnancial ﬁrms—along with, per-
haps, mild recession in Europe and Japan. But, given the broader risks, it
seems prudent to try to ﬁnd policies that will gradually reduce global imbal-
ances now rather than later. Such policies would include ﬁnding ways to
reverse the decline in U.S. saving, particularly by developing a more credi-
ble strategy to eliminate the structural federal budget deﬁcit and to tackle the
country’s actuarially insolvent old-age pension and medical beneﬁt pro-
grams. More rapid productivity growth in the rest of the world would be par-
ticularly helpful in achieving a benign adjustment, but only, as the model we
develop in this paper illustrates, if that growth is concentrated in nontraded
(domestically produced and consumed) goods rather than the export sector,
where such productivity growth could actually widen the U.S. trade deﬁcit.
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of global output on a purchasing power parity basis, take responsibility
for bearing its share of the burden of adjustment. Otherwise, if demand
shifts caused the U.S. current account deficit to close even by half (from
6 percent to 3 percent of GDP), while Asian currencies remain ﬁxed against
the dollar, we ﬁnd that European currencies would have to depreciate by
roughly 29 percent. Not only would Europe potentially suffer a severe
decline in export demand in that scenario; it would also incur huge losses
on its net foreign asset position: Europe would lose about $1 trillion if the
U.S. current account deﬁcit were halved, and twice that sum if it went to
zero.
We do not regard our perspective as particularly alarmist. Nouriel
Roubini and Brad Setser make the case that the situation is far grimmer
than we suggest, with global interest rates set to skyrocket as the dollar loses
its status as the premier reserve currency.
3 Olivier Blanchard, Francesco
Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa present an elegant and thoughtful analysis sug-
gesting that prospective dollar exchange rate changes are even larger than
those implied by our model.
4 William Cline argues that an unsustainable
U.S. ﬁscal policy has substantially elevated the risk of an adverse scenario.
5
In our view, any sober policymaker or ﬁnancial market analyst ought to
regard the U.S. current account deﬁcit as a sword of Damocles hanging
over the global economy.
Others, however, hold more Panglossian views. One leading benevo-
lent interpretation, variously called the “Bretton Woods II” model or the
“Deutsche Bank” view, focuses on China; that view is forcefully exposited
in this volume by Michael Dooley and Peter Garber. This theory explains
the large U.S. current account deﬁcit as a consequence of the central prob-
lem now facing the Chinese authorities: how to maintain rapid economic
growth so as to soak up surplus labor from the countryside. For China, a
dollar peg (or near peg) helps preserve the international competitiveness
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3. Roubini and Setser (2004).
4. Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (this volume).
5. Cline (forthcoming). Mann (2005), although not alarmist, also points to risks in the
adjustment process. Of course, similar discussions accompanied earlier U.S. adjustment
episodes, but the present situation is quite different in both scale and setting. Krugman
(1985, 1991) takes as dim a view as anyone on the sustainability of long-term twin (ﬁscal
and current account) deﬁcits. His views on the 1980s experience would seem to apply with
even greater force to the current scene.of exports while attracting foreign direct investment and avoiding stress
on the country’s fragile banking system. Is this argument plausible? Set
aside the fact that China maintained its peg even through the Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis of 1997–98 and as the dollar soared at the end of the 1990s (pre-
sumably making Chinese exports much less competitive), or that China
risks a classic exchange rate crisis if its fortunes ever turn, say, because of
political upheaval in the transition to a more democratic system. The real
weakness in the Bretton Woods II theory is that the Chinese economy is
still less than half the size of Japan’s, and less than three-quarters the size
of Germany’s, at market exchange rates. So, while running surpluses of
similar size to China’s relative to their GDP, Germany and Japan actually
account for a much larger share of global surpluses in absolute terms.
(After all, Germany, not China, is the world’s leading exporter.) And sur-
plus labor is hardly the problem in these aging countries.
U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, in a 2003 speech at
the Cato Institute and in many subsequent speeches, offers an intriguing
argument.
6 He agrees that the United States is unlikely to be able to con-
tinue borrowing such massive amounts relative to its income indeﬁnitely,
and he recognizes that the U.S. current account deﬁcit will therefore nar-
row substantially someday. Greenspan argues, however, that increasing
global ﬁnancial integration is both what allows the United States to run
such large deﬁcits and the saving factor that will greatly cushion the
process of unwinding those deﬁcits.
We completely agree that increasing global ﬁnancial integration can
explain larger current account deﬁcits, particularly to the extent that greater
trade integration helps underpin ﬁnancial integration, as in our original
analysis.
7 Indeed, this was a major point of our ﬁrst approaches to this
problem. A narrowing of the U.S. current account deﬁcit must ultimately
be the result, however, of more balanced trade, because the trade account
is overwhelmingly the main component of the current account. And, as
seemingly open as the U.S. economy is to ﬁnancial ﬂows, international
product markets remain quite imperfectly integrated.
Thus any correction to the trade balance is likely to entail a very large
change in the real effective dollar exchange rate: our baseline ﬁgure,
which assumes a moderate speed of adjustment and that the world’s major
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6. Greenspan (2004).
7. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a, 2000b).regions all return to current account balance, is 33 percent. A much smaller
dollar devaluation is possible only if the adjustment is stretched over a
very long period (say, a decade), in which case labor and capital mobility
across sectors and economies can signiﬁcantly reduce the need for rela-
tive price changes. On the other hand, should adjustment take place very
abruptly (say, because of a sudden collapse in U.S. housing prices leading
to an increase in saving, or a dramatic reallocation of global central bank
reserves toward the euro), the potential fall in the dollar is much larger
than our baseline estimate of 33 percent, primarily because sticky nomi-
nal prices and incomplete exchange rate pass-through hamper adjustment.
True, in a recent Federal Reserve study, Hilary Croke, Steven Kamin, and
Sylvain Leduc argue that sustained current account imbalances in indus-
trial countries have typically terminated in a relatively benign fashion.
8
But their threshold for a current account “reversal”—the country must
have run a deﬁcit of at least 2 percent of GDP for three years, and must
have improved its current account balance by at least 2 percent of GDP
and a third of the total deﬁcit—is a very low bar compared with where the
United States stands today. (Croke, Kamin, and Leduc are forced to choose
a low threshold, of course, because current account deﬁcits of the size,
relative to GDP, of the recent U.S. deﬁcits, although far from unprece-
dented, are not the norm.) Most important, the United States accounts for
over 75 percent of global deﬁcits today, as we have noted, and so any
comparison based on the experience of small countries, even small indus-
trial countries, is of limited value.
In addition to Chairman Greenspan, a number of academic researchers
have emphasized how some important changes in the global ﬁnancial sys-
tem, particularly over the past ten years, have changed the nature of inter-
national ﬁnancial adjustment. Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti,
in a series of papers, have documented the explosion of gross asset ﬂows.
9
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8. Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005). Freund and Warnock (2005) survey current
account adjustment in industrial countries and ﬁnd that deﬁcits tend to be associated with
real depreciations, which are larger for consumption-driven deﬁcits.
9. See especially Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a, 2005b). In line with this develop-
ment, Cooper (2001) identiﬁes ongoing international portfolio diversiﬁcation as a driving
force behind the U.S. deﬁcit. Diversiﬁcation does not, however, require any net capital
ﬂows: even with a balanced current account, foreigners and U.S. residents can still swap
assets. According to preliminary estimates by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, for exam-
ple, private foreign investors added $1.1 trillion in U.S. assets to their portfolios in 2004,
far more than that year’s U.S. current account deﬁcit of $666 billion.They and Cédric Tille, as well as Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène
Rey, have shown that asset revaluation effects from dollar depreciation
can have a signiﬁcant impact on U.S. net ﬁnancial obligations to foreign-
ers.
10 Gourinchas and Rey point out, in fact, that the historical extent of
such revaluations suggests that the United States might need to adjust its
trade balance by only two-thirds of the amount that would be needed to
fully repay its net external debt; even this, however, would still imply very
large dollar movements. We agree that the size and composition of gross
asset positions are increasingly important, and our model simulations in
this paper explicitly take account of the revaluation channel. We ﬁnd,
however, that valuation effects mute the requisite exchange rate changes
only modestly.
The growing ﬁnancial globalization that these authors and Chairman
Greenspan emphasize is, moreover, a two-edged sword. Enhanced global
financial integration may well facilitate gradual current account and
exchange rate adjustment, but it might also promote the development of
large, unbalanced ﬁnancial positions that leave the world economy vul-
nerable to ﬁnancial meltdown in the face of sharp exchange rate swings.
The net foreign asset revaluation channel might help modestly, but a rise
in U.S. interest rates could well wipe out the beneﬁts. Because the United
States borrows heavily in the form of low-risk bonds, while lending heav-
ily in the form of equities and high-risk bonds, it is especially sensitive to
even a modest rise in the interest rates it pays on its foreign debt. Indeed,
we show that, in terms of exchange rate adjustments, the adverse effect of
a 1.25-percentage-point rise in the interest rate that the United States pays
on its short-term foreign debt is similar in magnitude to the beneﬁts gained
via the valuation channel, even with a 20 percent dollar depreciation. More
generally, although increased global ﬁnancial integration and leverage can
indeed help countries diversify risk, they also expose the system to other
vulnerabilities—such as counterparty risk—on a much larger scale than ever
before. All in all, although we believe that growing ﬁnancial globalization
is largely a positive development, it does not justify excessive conﬁdence
in a benign adjustment process.
This paper begins by trying to put the recent U.S. experience with current
account imbalances in historical perspective. We hope this ﬁrst section
will provide a useful reference, although some readers will already be famil-
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10. Tille (2004); Gourinchas and Rey (2005a, 2005b).iar with the essential elements. One historical observation that is important
for our later analysis is that the United States (so far) has had the remark-
able ability to consistently pay a lower rate of interest on its liabilities than
it earns on its assets. Some component of this differential in returns has
been due to luck, another to huge central bank holdings of U.S. Treasury
bills, another perhaps to the unique and central role of the dollar in interna-
tional ﬁnance. Still another, which we have already emphasized, is the fact
that Americans hold a much larger share of their foreign assets in equities
and high-risk (equity-like) bonds than foreigners hold of U.S. assets (and
thus beneﬁt more from the equity premium). An open question is whether
this advantage can continue in the face of large and persistent U.S. deﬁcits.
We then provide a nontechnical summary of our core three-region
(Asia, Europe, and the United States) model. Readers interested in the tech-
nical details of our model can read the theoretical section that follows, and
the most adventurous can venture into appendix A, where we fully lay out
the structure. Our model simulations calibrate the requisite dollar decline
against European and Asian currencies under various scenarios. Most of
our analysis focuses on real exchange rates, but, by assuming that the
regions’ central banks target GDP or consumption deﬂators (or sometimes,
in the case of Asia, exchange rates against the dollar), we are able to extract
nominal exchange rate predictions (relative to the initial position) as well.
As noted earlier, our baseline simulation, in which Asia’s, Europe’s, and
the United States’ current accounts all go to zero, implies that the dollar
needs to depreciate in real effective terms by 33 percent (and in nominal
terms by a similar amount). Because the trade balance responds to an
exchange rate change only with a lag, this exercise slightly overstates the
necessary depreciation relative to today’s exchange rates. However, our cal-
ibration assumes ﬂexible prices and does not allow for possible exchange
rate overshooting, which could signiﬁcantly amplify the effect. A halving of
the U.S. deﬁcit, with counterpart surplus reductions shared by Asia and
Europe in the same proportions as in the ﬁrst simulation (arguably a more
likely scenario over the short term) of complete current account adjustment,
would lead to a depreciation of the real effective dollar of 17 percent. In our
base case the real value of Asian currencies would need to rise by 35 percent
and that of European currencies by 29 percent against the dollar.
If, however, Asia sticks to its dollar exchange rate peg as the U.S. cur-
rent account deﬁcit narrows, the real effective value of the European cur-
rencies would have to rise by almost 60 percent. Indeed, to maintain its
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account balance, Asia would actually have to better than double its already
massive current account surplus. Even halving these numbers (correspond-
ing, for example, to the case in which the U.S. current account deﬁcit falls
only by half), one can still appreciate the enormous protectionist pressures
that are likely to emerge if Asia tries to stick to its dollar peg in the face of
a signiﬁcant pullback in the United States’ voracious borrowing.
It is perhaps surprising that, despite Asia’s current account surplus being
several times that of Europe (which we deﬁne broadly here to include the
euro zone and the other largest non-Asian, non-U.S. economies), the
required rise in the Asian currencies relative to the European currencies is
not even larger in the global rebalancing scenario. As we shall see, a cou-
ple of factors drive this result: one is that Asia’s economies are relatively
more open than Europe’s to the rest of the world, so that a given exchange
rate change has a bigger impact on trade; the other is that a large, unantic-
ipated dollar depreciation inﬂicts brutal damage on Asia’s net foreign
asset position, a factor we explicitly incorporate in our calibrations.
The analysis highlights two important but widely misunderstood points
about the mechanism of U.S. current account deﬁcit reduction. First, real
dollar depreciation is not a substitute for policies that raise U.S. saving,
such as reductions in the federal ﬁscal deﬁcit. Instead, depreciation and sav-
ing increases are complements: exchange rate changes are needed to bal-
ance goods markets after a change in global consumption patterns, whereas
dollar depreciation that is not accompanied by U.S. expenditure reduction
will lead to inﬂationary pressures that, over time, will offset the initial gains
in U.S. competitiveness. The second, and related, point is that it makes little
sense to ask how much dollar depreciation is needed to reduce the current
account deﬁcit by 1 percent of GDP. Exchange rates and current account
balances are jointly determined endogenous variables. As the simulations
in this paper illustrate, there are numerous different scenarios in which the
U.S. external deﬁcit might be erased, all with different implications for
the dollar’s foreign exchange value.
Although our model is considerably richer than those previously advanced
in the literature (including our own earlier studies), it remains subject to a
wide range of qualiﬁcations and interpretations; we try to emphasize the
most important ones. Nevertheless, we view the simulations as quite use-
ful. The paper’s ﬁnal section highlights the main conclusions that we draw
from the technical analysis.
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1970–2005 and Beyond
The main analytical contribution of the paper is its modeling and numer-
ical calibration of exchange rate and net foreign asset valuation adjustments
under alternative scenarios for reducing the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Our framework is intended as a tool for assessing risks and evaluating pol-
icy options. At some level, however, the exercise must entail an assessment
of how unstable the current trajectory of external payments imbalances
really is, along with the likelihood of adjustment taking place in the next
few years. In order to think about this overarching issue, it is helpful to
understand the history of the problem.
Perspectives on the U.S. Deﬁcit
Figure 1 traces the U.S. current account balance as a percent of GDP from
1970 to the present. After ﬂuctuating between +1 and −1 percent of GDP
during the 1970s, the current account began to go into deep deﬁcit during
the mid-1980s, reaching 3.4 percent of GDP in 1987. After recovering
temporarily at the end of the 1980s and actually attaining a slight surplus
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Figure 1. Current Account, 1970–2005ain 1991 (propped up by a large, one-time transfer from foreign govern-
ments to help pay for the Gulf War), the U.S. current account balance
began a slow, steady deterioration throughout the 1990s, which continues
today. As already noted, U.S. international borrowing in 2004 accounted
for about 75 percent of the excess of national saving over investment of all
the world’s current account surplus countries.
What are the proximate causes of this profound deterioration in the U.S.
external balance? That, of course, is the $666 billion (and rising) question.
Since, in principle, the current account balances of all countries should add
up to zero, the U.S. current account deﬁcit—equal to the excess of U.S.
investment over national saving—has to be viewed as the net result of the
collective investment and saving decisions of the entire world. German
demographics, OPEC oil revenue investment decisions, depressed invest-
ment in Asia—all these factors and many others impinge on global interest
rates and exchange rates and, in turn, on U.S. investment and saving. We
do not believe there is any simple answer.
Nevertheless, U.S. ﬁscal policy clearly has played a dominant role in
some episodes. The current account balance equals, by deﬁnition, the sum
of government saving less investment plus private saving less investment.
Because the Ricardian equivalence of public debt and taxes does not seem
to hold in practice, the big Reagan tax cuts of the 1980s almost certainly
played a role in the U.S. current account deﬁcits of that era. Similarly, the
Bush II tax cuts of the 2000s have likely played a role over the past few
years, preventing the current account deﬁcit from shrinking despite the
post-2000 collapse in U.S. investment. Currency over- and undervaluations
also loomed large in both episodes, usually operating with a lag of one to
two years. For example, the peak of the U.S. current account deﬁcit in 1987
lagged by two years the peak of the real trade-weighted dollar exchange
rate (ﬁgure 2). The weak dollar of the mid-1990s was matched by a pause
in the U.S. current account’s decline, and the dollar peak in early 2002
was followed again, with some lag, by a sharp worsening in the external
balance. Admittedly, both correlations with the current account deﬁcit—
of ﬁscal deﬁcits and dollar appreciation—are fairly loose. As ﬁgure 3
illustrates, U.S. ﬁscal deﬁcits have expanded massively in recent years
compared with those of the rest of the world. But, as the ﬁgure also illus-
trates, Japan has run even larger ﬁscal deﬁcits relative to its GDP than the
United States, yet at the same time it has consistently run the world’s
largest current account surplus in absolute terms.








1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003
Index, March 1973 = 100
Source:–Federal Reserve data.


















Source:–2005 OECD Factbook, OECD Economic Outlook No. 77. 
a.–The data are on a national accounts basis, averaged across years indicated.
Figure 2. Real Effective Exchange Rate of the Dollar, 1973–2004a
Figure 3. Fiscal Balances in Selected Major Economies
aIndeed, during the 1990s the major proximate drivers of the U.S. cur-
rent account balance were a declining rate of private saving and rising rate
of investment. The U.S. personal saving rate, which had been stable at
around 10 percent of disposable personal income until 1985, has steadily
declined since, reaching a mere 1 percent in 2004. The declining private
saving rate has apparently been driven ﬁrst by the stock price boom of the
1990s and then by the still-ongoing housing price boom.
11 Were the U.S.
personal saving rate simply to rise to 5 percent of disposable personal
income, or halfway toward its level of two decades ago, more than half of
today’s current account deﬁcit could be eliminated.
During the late 1990s U.S. investment was robust, as shown in ﬁgure 4,
so that the United States’ high external borrowing really was, in principle,
ﬁnancing future growth. Today, however, the picture has changed. As ﬁg-
ure 4 also shows, the main proximate driver of recent U.S. current account
deficits has been low private and government saving rather than high
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11. Obviously, if one measures saving taking into account capital gains and losses on
wealth, the trend decline in saving is much less, although housing wealth is largely not
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Figure 4. U.S. Current Account, Saving, and Investment, 1970–2004investment. So much for the prominent view of former Treasury secretary
Paul O’Neill, who argued that the U.S. external deﬁcit was driven mainly
by foreigners’ desire to invest in productive U.S. assets. The more sophis-
ticated analysis of Jaume Ventura is also inconsistent with declining U.S.
investment.
12
Another important factor contributing to the U.S. current account deﬁcit
since the late 1990s has been the persistently low level of investment in
Asia since the region’s 1997–98 ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, today, sluggish
investment demand outside the United States, particularly in Europe and
Japan but also in many emerging markets, is a major factor holding global
interest rates down. Low global interest rates, in turn, are a major driver in
home price appreciation, which, particularly in the United States with its
deep, liquid home-equity loan markets, contributes to high consumption.
International Assets, Liabilities, and Returns
Naturally, this sustained string of current account deﬁcits has led to a
deterioration in the United States’ net foreign asset position, as illustrated
in ﬁgure 5. In 1982 the United States held net foreign assets equal to just
over 7 percent of GDP, whereas now the country has a net foreign debt
amounting to about 25 percent of GDP. Accompanying this growth in net
debt has been a stunning increase in gross international asset and liability
positions, as ﬁgure 5 also shows. From 29.5 percent and 22.3 percent of
GDP in 1982, U.S. gross foreign assets and liabilities, respectively, had
risen to 71.5 percent and 95.6 percent of GDP by the end of 2003. This
process of increasing international leverage—borrowing abroad in order
to invest abroad—characterizes other industrial country portfolios and is
in fact much further advanced for some smaller countries such as the
Netherlands and primary ﬁnancial hubs such as the United Kingdom; see
table 1 for some illustrative comparative data.
13
The implications of the reduction in U.S. net foreign wealth would be
darker but for the fact that the United States has long enjoyed much better
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12. Ventura (2001).
13. See also Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a, 2005b) and Obstfeld (2004). The BEA
applies market valuation to foreign direct investment holdings starting only in 1982. Gour-
inchas and Rey (2005b) construct U.S. international position data going back to 1952. In
1976, with foreign direct investment valued at current cost rather than at market value, U.S.
gross foreign assets amounted to 25 percent of GDP, and gross foreign liabilities were 12.6











Source:– –Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
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Figure 5. U.S. Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1982–2003
Table 1. International Investment Positions of Selected Industrial Countries, 2003
Percent of GDP
a
Country Gross assets Gross liabilities Net position
Canada 75 93 −18
Euro area 107 118 −10
France 179 172 7
Germany 148 141 6
Italy 95 100 −5
Japan 87 48 39
Switzerland 503 367 135
United Kingdom 326 329 −2
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
a. Gross assets may differ from the sum of gross liabilities and the net position because of rounding.
investment performance on its foreign assets than have foreign residents
on their U.S. assets. This rate-of-return advantage, coupled with the
expansion in foreign leverage documented in ﬁgure 5, has so far allowed
the United States to maintain a generally positive balance of net interna-
tional investment income even as its net international investment position
has become increasingly negative. Figure 6 shows two measures of U.S.net international investment income.
14 The ﬁrst, net foreign investment
income (income receipts on U.S. assets owned abroad less income pay-
ments on foreign-owned assets in the United States), is taken from the
U.S. balance of payments accounts and comprises transactions data only,
that is, actual income earned on assets. Interestingly, this balance has not
yet entered negative territory, although it could do so soon. Over 1983–
2003 the income return on U.S.-owned assets exceeded that on U.S. lia-
bilities by 1.2 percentage points a year on average.
A more comprehensive investment income measure adds the capital gains
on foreign assets and liabilities, reﬂecting price changes that could be due to
either asset price movements (such as stock price changes) or exchange rate
changes. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) incorporates estimates
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14. Gourinchas and Rey (2005b) present a similar graph covering a much longer
period. The estimates in the text are consistent with those found by Obstfeld and Taylor
(forthcoming) using a different methodology. For a complementary discussion of returns
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Figure 6. U.S. Net Foreign Investment Income and Total Net Return on Foreign
Assets, 1983–2003of these gains into its updates of the U.S. international investment position,
although they do not appear in the international transactions or national
income accounts. As one would expect, ﬁgure 6 shows this net income
measure to be much more volatile than that based on investment income
alone. Although it is negative in some years, cumulatively this balance is
even more favorable for the United States than the smoother transactions
measure. On average over 1983–2003, the total return on the United
States’ foreign investment, inclusive of capital gains, exceeded that on U.S.
liabilities to foreigners by a remarkable 3.1 percentage points a year.
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To understand better the implications of the U.S. rate-of-return advan-
tage, let rW be the rate of return on foreign assets, rU the rate of return on
liabilities, F the stock of net foreign assets, and L gross liabilities. Then
the net total return on the international portfolio is r
WF + (rW − rU)L. This
expression shows that, even when F < 0 as it is for the United States, total
investment inﬂows can still easily be positive when r
W > rU and the stock
of gross liabilities is sufﬁciently large. The expression also reveals, how-
ever, that the leveraging mechanism generating the U.S. surplus on
investment returns also heightens the risk associated with a possible
reversal. An unresolved but critical question is whether the United States’
favorable position in international markets will be sustained in the face of
a large and growing external debt. Should the United States at some point
be forced to pay a higher rate on its liabilities, the negative income effect
will be proportional to the extent of leverage, L.
Part of the historical U.S. international investment advantage is a matter
of chance and circumstance. Japanese investors famously bought trophy
properties like Pebble Beach golf club, Rockefeller Center, and Columbia
Pictures at premium prices, only to see those investments sour. Europeans
poured money into the U.S. stock market only at the end of the 1990s, just
as the technology bubble was about to burst. However, a deeper reason why
the United States’ net debt position has accumulated only relatively slowly
is that Americans hold a considerably larger fraction of their foreign assets
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15. The broad rate-of-return measures for gross assets and liabilities are constructed by
adding to the investment income ﬂow the total capital gain on the previous end-of-period
assets (or liabilities) and then dividing this total return by the previous value of assets (or
liabilities). Thus, in 2003, a year in which the dollar depreciated, the rate of return on U.S.
foreign assets was 19 percent, and that on liabilities 8.4 percent. Total capital gains are cal-
culated by subtracting the change in U.S.-owned assets abroad (change in foreign-owned
assets in the United States), as reported in the ﬁnancial account, from the change in U.S. for-
eign assets (liabilities) at market value, as reported in the BEA international position data.in equities (both portfolio equity and foreign direct investment) than do
foreigners of their U.S. assets. At the end of 2003, Americans held almost
$7.9 trillion in foreign assets, of which 60 percent was in equities, either
foreign stocks or foreign direct investment (here measured at market value).
Foreigners, by contrast, held only 38 percent of their $10.5 trillion in U.S.
assets in the form of equity. Given that equity has, over long periods, con-
sistently paid a signiﬁcant premium over bonds, it is not surprising that
U.S. residents have remained net recipients of investment returns even
though the United States apparently crossed the line to being a net debtor
in the late 1980s.
A major reason why foreigners hold relatively more U.S. bonds than
Americans hold foreign bonds is that the dollar remains the world’s main
reserve and vehicle currency. Indeed, of the $3.8 trillion in international
reserves held by central banks worldwide, a very large share is in dollars,
and much of it is in short-term instruments.
16 Figure 7 illustrates the bur-
geoning reserves of Asia, now in excess of $2 trillion. According to the
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Figure 7. Foreign Exchange Reserves, Selected Countries, Various YearsBEA, over 45 percent of the $700 billion stock of dollar currency is held
abroad, and this is probably an underestimate.
17 (Note that, when one speaks
of the United States enjoying rents or seigniorage from issuing a reserve
currency, the main effects may come from foreigners’ relative willingness to
hold cash or liquid short-term Treasury debt, rather than from any substantial
inherent U.S. interest rate advantage.) In any event, our empirical analysis
will take account of the systematically lower return on U.S. liabilities than
on assets elsewhere, and will ask what might happen should that advan-
tage suddenly disappear in the process of current account reversal.
18
At present, as we have noted, the net U.S. foreign debt equals about 
25 percent of GDP. This ratio already roughly equals the previous peak of
26 percent, reached in 1894. A simple calculation shows that if U.S. nom-
inal GDP grows at 6 percent a year and the current account deﬁcit remains
at 6 percent of nominal GDP, the ratio of U.S. net foreign debt to GDP
will asymptotically approach 100 percent. Few countries have ever reached
anywhere near that level of indebtedness without having a crisis of some
sort.
19
If large, sudden exchange rate movements are possible, the greater depth
of today’s international ﬁnancial markets becomes a potential source of
systemic stress. As we have documented, the volume of international asset
trading is now vast. Although many participants believe themselves to be
hedged against exchange rate and interest rate risks, the wide range of lightly
regulated or unregulated nonbank counterparties now operating in the
markets raises a real risk of cascading ﬁnancial collapse. In a world where
a country’s current account may adjust abruptly, bringing with it large
changes in international relative prices, a persistently large U.S. deﬁcit
constitutes an overhanging systemic threat.
A sober assessment of present global imbalances suggests the need for
a quantitative analysis of how a U.S. current account adjustment would
affect exchange rates. We take this up next.
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17. See Porter and Judson (1996).
18. Of course, multinationals’ practice of income shifting in response to differing
national tax rates on proﬁts distorts reported investment income ﬂows, making an accurate
picture of the true ﬂows difﬁcult to obtain. See, for example, Grubert, Goodspeed, and
Swenson (1993) and Harris and others (1993). The expansion of gross international posi-
tions over the past decade may have worsened this problem.
19. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a).Summary of the Analytical Framework
Here we summarize the main features and mechanisms in our analysis.
After reading this section, readers who are primarily interested in our
exchange rate predictions can skip the following section, which presents
the details of the model, and proceed directly to the discussion of our
numerical ﬁndings.
We work within a three-region model of a world economy consisting
of the United States, Europe, and Asia. These regions are linked by trade
and by a matrix of international asset and liability positions. Each region
produces a distinctive export good, which its residents consume along with
imports from the other two regions. In addition, each region produces non-
traded goods, which its residents alone consume.
A key but realistic assumption is that each country’s residents have a
substantial relative preference for the traded good that is produced at home
and exported; that is, consumption of traded goods is intensive in the home
export, creating a home bias in traded goods consumption. This feature builds
in a “transfer effect” on the terms of trade, which provides one of the key
mechanisms through which changes in the international pattern of current
account balances change real and nominal exchange rates. A reduction in
the U.S. current account deﬁcit, if driven by a fall in U.S. spending and a
matching rise in U.S. saving, represents a shift in world demand toward
foreign traded goods, which depresses the price of U.S. exports relative to
that of imports from both Asia and Europe. (The international terms of
trade of the United States deteriorate.) Because the U.S.-produced export
good has a larger weight in the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) than that
of foreign imports, whereas foreign export goods similarly have larger
weights in their home countries’ CPIs, the result is both a real and a nom-
inal depreciation of the dollar.
This terms-of-trade effect of current account adjustment has been promi-
nent in the literature, but it is potentially less important quantitatively than
is a second real exchange rate effect captured in our model. That effect is
the impact of current account adjustment on the prices of nontraded
goods. The CPI can be viewed as made up of individual sub-CPIs for
traded and nontraded goods, with the latter empirically having about three
times the weight of the former in the overall CPI, given the importance of
nontraded service inputs into the delivery even of traded products to con-
sumers. The real exchange rate between two currencies is the ratio of the
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Thus a fall in a country’s prices for nontraded goods, relative to the same-
currency price of nontraded goods abroad, will depress its relative price
level just as a terms-of-trade setback does, causing both a real and a nomi-
nal depreciation of its currency. Because nontraded goods are so impor-
tant a component of the CPI, ignoring effects involving their prices would
omit much of the effect of current account adjustment on exchange rates.
Hence this additional mechanism, absent from much of the policy discus-
sion, is critical to include.
When the U.S. external deﬁcit falls as a result of a cut in domestic con-
sumption, part of the reduction in demand falls on traded goods (exports
as well as imports), but much of it falls on U.S. nontraded goods. The con-
sequent fall in the nontraded goods’ prices reinforces the effect of weaker
terms of trade in causing the dollar to depreciate against the currencies of
Europe and Asia. As noted, in our calibration this second effect receives
more than twice the weight that terms-of-trade effects receive in explain-
ing exchange rate movements.
We consider several scenarios for U.S. current account adjustment,
involving different degrees of burden sharing by Europe and Asia and the
resulting effect on those regions’ bilateral and effective exchange rates. For
example, if Europe’s deﬁcit rises to offset a fall in America’s deﬁcit, while
Asia’s surplus remains constant, the dollar will depreciate more against
Europe’s currencies, and less against Asia’s, than if Asia and Europe shared
in the burden of accommodating the U.S. return to external balance. In terms
of its trade-weighted effective exchange rate, the dollar depreciates more
under the second of these two scenarios. Because Asia trades more with the
United States than Europe does, bilateral depreciation against Asia’s curren-
cies plays the more important role in determining the effective depreciation.
We also consider the effect of dollar exchange rate changes in revalu-
ing gross foreign asset positions, thus redistributing the burden of interna-
tional indebtedness, as well as the possibility that the adjustment process,
especially if disorderly, could entail higher interest payments abroad on U.S.
short-term foreign obligations. Finally, key parameters in our model gov-
ern the substitutability in consumption among various traded goods and
between traded and nontraded goods. In general, the lower these substitu-
tion elasticities, the greater the relative price changes caused by current
account adjustment and the greater, therefore, the resulting terms-of-trade
and exchange rate responses. Because the values of these elasticities are
86 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005quite uncertain and can differ between the short and the long run, we
quantitatively examine their role in generating our numerical estimates.
The Model
The three-country endowment model we develop here extends our earlier
small-country and two-country frameworks.
20 We label the three coun-
tries (or regions), whose sizes can be ﬂexibly calibrated, U (for the United
States), E (for Europe), and A (for Asia). The model distinguishes both
between home- and foreign-produced traded goods and between traded
and nontraded goods (with the latter margin, largely ignored in many dis-
cussions of the U.S. current account deﬁcit, turning out to be the more
important of the two quantitatively in our simulations). Our focus here
will be on articulating the new insights that can be gained by going from
two countries to three, particularly in understanding different scenarios of
real exchange rate adjustment across regions as the current account deﬁcit
of the United States falls to a sustainable level.
Four features of our model are of particular interest. First, by assuming
that endowments are given exogenously for the various types of outputs,
we implicitly assume that capital and labor are not mobile between sec-
tors in the short run. To the extent that global imbalances close only
slowly over long periods (which experience suggests is not the most likely
case), factor mobility across sectors will mute any real exchange rate
effects.
21 Second, we do not allow for changes in the mix of traded goods
produced or for the endogenous determination of the range of nontraded
goods, two factors that would operate over the longer run and could also
mute the effects on real exchange rates of current account movements.
Third, our main analysis assumes that nominal prices are completely ﬂexi-
ble. That assumption—in contrast to our assumption on factor mobility—
almost surely leads us to understate the likely real exchange rate effects of
a current account reversal. As we discuss later, with nominal rigidities
and imperfect pass-through from exchange rates to prices, the exchange
rate will need to move more, and perhaps much more, than in our base
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20. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a and 2004, respectively).
21. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).case in order to maintain employment stability. Fourth, we do not explicitly
model the intertemporal allocation of consumption, but rather focus on
the intratemporal price consequences of alternative patterns of production-
consumption imbalances.
The Core Model
Although notationally intricate, our core three-region model is concep-
tually quite simple. We assume that consumers in each of the three regions
allocate their spending between traded and nontraded goods. Within the
category of traded goods, they choose among goods produced in each of
the three regions. The equilibrium terms of trade and the relative price of
traded and nontraded goods (and thus both bilateral and effective real
exchange rates) are determined endogenously. Given assumptions about
central bank policy (depending, for example, on whether the central bank
aims to stabilize the CPI deﬂator, the GDP deﬂator, or a bilateral exchange
rate), the model can also generate nominal exchange rates.
We begin by defining Ci
j ≡ country i consumption of good (or good
category) j. The comprehensive country i consumption index depends on
U.S., European, and Asian traded goods consumption (T), as well as con-
sumption of domestic nontraded goods (N). It is written in the following
nested form:
with
We do not assume identical preferences in the three countries. On the
contrary, we wish to allow, both in deﬁning real exchange rates and in
() 21
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88 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005assessing the effects of shocks, for a realistic home bias in traded goods
consumption, such that each country has a substantial relative preference
for the traded good that it produces and exports abroad.
22 Home consump-
tion bias gives rise to a “transfer effect,” whereby an increase in relative
national expenditure improves a country’s terms of trade, that is, raises
the price of its exports relative to that of its imports.
In the equations above, the United States and Europe are “mirror sym-
metric” in their preferences for each other’s goods, but each attaches the
same weight to Asian goods. Asia weights U.S. and European imports
equally but may differ in openness from the United States and Europe.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that 1 > β > α > 1⁄2. We also assume that δ > 1⁄2. For
example, if β=0.8 and α=0.7, then the U.S. traded goods consumption
basket has a weight of 0.7 on U.S. exports, 0.1 on European exports, and 0.2
on Asian exports. (A very similar—and for many exercises isomorphic—
model arises if one assumes that all countries have identical preferences,
but that international trading costs are higher than domestic trading costs.)23
The values of the two parameters θ and η are critical in our analysis.
Parameter θ is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between traded and
nontraded goods. Parameter η is the (constant) elasticity of substitution
between domestically produced traded goods and imports from either for-
eign region. The two parameters are important because they underlie the
magnitudes of price responses to quantity adjustments. Lower substitution
elasticities imply that sharper price changes are needed to accommodate a
given change in quantities consumed.
Price Indexes and Real Exchange Rates
Using standard methods, we derive exact consumption-based price
indexes.24 Deﬁne Pi
j ≡ the country i exact price index for consumption cat-
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22. Warnock (2003) also takes this approach.
23. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b).
24. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).where subscript C denotes the comprehensive consumption basket. (Our
main analysis is in terms of real prices and exchange rates, so all prices can
be expressed in terms of the common numeraire.) In equation 3,
Here Pi, i = U, E, A, is just the price of the differentiated traded good pro-
duced by country i.
We assume the law of one price for traded goods, so that the price of any
given country’s traded good is the same in all regions. (In practice, of course,
the law of one price holds mainly in the breach, partly because of the dif-
ﬁculties in separating out the truly tradable component of “traded” goods.)
Because of the home export consumption bias we have assumed, the price
indexes for traded goods P
i
T can differ across countries even when the law
of one price holds, reﬂecting the asymmetric consumption weightings. As
a result, changes in the terms of trade, through their differential effects on
countries’ price levels for traded goods, affect real exchange rates.
There are three bilateral terms of trade, three bilateral real exchange
rates, and three real effective exchange rates. The terms of trade are
Here, for example, a rise in τU,E is a rise in the price of European traded
goods in terms of U.S. traded goods, that is, a deterioration in the U.S. terms
of trade. Bilateral real exchange rates are
A rise in qU,E, for example, is a rise in the price of the European consump-
tion basket in terms of the U.S. consumption basket, that is, a real depre-
ciation of the dollar.
As we have noted, asymmetric preferences over traded goods allow the
terms of trade to affect traded goods price indexes. The United States’
price index places a comparatively high weight on U.S. exports, whereas
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90 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005Europe’s does the same for its own exports. Thus the U.S. traded goods
price index falls relative to Europe’s when Europe’s bilateral terms of
trade against the United States improve. Denoting a percent change with a
caret, we can logarithmically approximate the evolution of the relative
European-to-American traded goods price ratio as
(Exact formulas for relative price indexes, which we use to generate the
numerical results reported below, are given in appendix A.) This expres-
sion equates the difference between European and U.S. price inﬂation in
traded goods to the European consumption weight on its own exports, α,
less the U.S. consumption weight on imports from Europe, β−α , all
multiplied by the percentage increase in Europe’s terms of trade against the
United States. Observe that the terms of trade against Asia do not enter this
expression. Given the bilateral Europe-U.S. terms of trade, changes in the
terms of trade against Asia enter the European and U.S. traded goods price
indexes symmetrically (that is, with identical consumption weights of 1 −β )
and therefore drop out in computing their log-difference change.
Similarly, the evolution of the Asian price level for traded goods rela-
tive to that of the United States also reﬂects terms-of-trade movements.
But because, under our assumptions, Asia trades more extensively with
Europe than the United States does, the prices of European exports have a
relatively bigger impact on Asia’s average import prices. This is shown
by the following logarithmic approximation:
The weights on the terms-of-trade changes here simply reﬂect relative con-
sumption weights, as before. Now, however, given the bilateral Asia-U.S.
terms of trade, an improvement in Europe’s terms of trade vis-à-vis the
United States raises Asia’s price index for traded goods relative to that in the
United States when, as we assume in our simulations, the Asian consump-
tion weight on European imports, (1 −δ )/2, exceeds the weight attached
by U.S. consumers, β−α . Such third-country asymmetries cannot be cap-
tured, of course, in a two-country framework.
Bilateral real exchange rate movements follow immediately from the
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Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 91change in the bilateral real exchange rate is simply the consumption
weight on traded goods times the log change in relative traded goods price
indexes, plus the consumption weight on nontraded goods times the log
change in relative nontraded goods price indexes:
Analogously, between the United States and Asia we have
We emphasize one key aspect of these expressions. The weight on
nontraded goods is likely to be quite large because of the large component
of nontradable services included in the consumer prices of goods gener-
ally classiﬁed as entirely tradable. In our simulations we therefore take
the weight on nontraded goods above, 1 −γ , to be 0.75. An implication is
that, although the terms of trade certainly are an empirically important
factor in real exchange rate determination given home consumption bias,
relative prices for nontraded goods potentially play an even larger quanti-
tative role.
Solution Methodology
The methodology we use to calculate the effects of current account shifts
on relative prices is essentially the same as that in our earlier papers,
extended to a three-region setting.
25 Given ﬁxed output endowments, an
assumed initial pattern of current account imbalances, an assumed initial
pattern of international indebtedness, and a global interest rate, relative
prices are determined by the equality of supply and demand in all goods
markets. Changes in the international pattern of external imbalances, whether
due to consumption shifts or other changes (including changes in produc-
tivity), shift the supply and demand curves in the various markets, result-
ing in a new set of equilibrium prices. These are the price changes we
report below, under a variety of current account adjustment scenarios. (The
global sums of external imbalances and of net international asset positions
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25. The methodology is speciﬁed in appendix A and further online at www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/papers/BPEA2005.pdf.There are six market-clearing conditions, covering the three regional
nontraded goods markets and the three global markets for traded goods
(although one of these is redundant by Walras’ Law). The ﬁve indepen-
dent equilibrium conditions allow solutions for
—the U.S. terms of trade against Europe, τU,E
—the U.S. terms of trade against Asia, τU,A










—the price of nontraded goods in terms of traded goods in Asia, PA
N/PA
T.
One can then calculate the three bilateral real exchange rates, for which
these ﬁve relative prices are the critical inputs. Because of the asymmetric
preferences over traded goods, there is, as we have noted, a transfer effect
in the model (wealth transfers feed into the terms of trade and through that
channel into real exchange rates), although it is more complex than would be
the case with only two countries in the world. Finally, we will also want 
to deﬁne and analyze real effective (loosely speaking, trade-weighted)
exchange rates:
Three extensions to the analysis add to its relevance and realism.
26
First, we ask how real exchange rate changes translate into nominal
exchange rate changes; this depends on central bank policy. In general,
this turns out not to be a critical issue empirically; the other two exten-
sions are potentially far more important. One of these is to take into
account how exchange rate changes affect the net foreign asset positions
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26. Details can be found in appendix A and online at www.economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/rogoff/papers/BPEA2005.pdf.assets and liabilities.
27 This valuation effect is signiﬁcant, but its impact on
aggregate demand is of secondary importance compared with the primary
demand shifts emphasized in our preceding analysis. Finally, our third
extension takes into account the effect of a rise in relative U.S. interest
rates (due, say, to concern about government deﬁcits or erosion of the dol-
lar’s reserve currency status). This effect, which works to worsen rather
than ease the adjustment problem, is also signiﬁcant, although again it is
less important (at least over the range of interest rates we consider) than
the primary effects of a rebalancing of global demand.
Model Predictions
With these critical behavioral parameters in hand, we are now ready to
explore the model’s quantitative predictions for global exchange rates and
the terms of trade under various scenarios for rebalancing the U.S. current
account. We ﬁrst need to think about parametrizing the model.
Choosing Parameters
As we have already observed, the critical parameters in the model are θ,
the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and nontraded
goods, and η, the elasticity of substitution in consumption among the traded
goods produced by the three regions. The lower are these elasticities, the
greater the exchange rate and price adjustments needed to accommodate
any interregional shifts in aggregate demand. Most of our simulations will
be based on a value of θ=1, which is high relative to some estimates sug-
gested in the literature.
28 We will also report results, however, for an even
higher elasticity of θ=2.
Our baseline choice of η=2 as a representative aggregate trade elas-
ticity is a compromise between two sets of evidence. Estimates based on
trade ﬂows within disaggregated product categories cover a wide range
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27. As noted above, this effect has recently been emphasized by Tille (2004), Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005a, 2005b), and Gourinchas and Rey (2005a, 2005b).
28. Mendoza’s (1991) point estimate is 0.74, Ostry and Reinhart (1992) report esti-
mates in the range 0.66 to 1.28 for a sample of developing countries, and Stockman and
Tesar (1995) use an estimate of 0.44. Using a different approach, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2004) derive estimates as low as 0.5. Indeed, for larger and relatively closed economies
(such as the United States, Europe, and Japan), they suggest that the value should be even
lower.but typically include many values much higher than η=2.29 On the other
hand, conventionally estimated aggregate trade equations, as well as cali-
brations of dynamic general equilibrium models, tend to indicate much
smaller values for η, typically 1 or even lower.
A number of mechanisms have been suggested to explain this discrep-
ancy, some echoing Guy Orcutt’s classic skepticism about the low elastic-
ities seemingly implied by macro-level estimators.
30 Aggregation bias
lowers estimated macroelasticities because the price movements of low-
elasticity goods tend to dominate overall movements in import and export
price indexes.
31 Another issue is that macroeconomic estimates of business-
cycle frequency correlations tend to confound permanent and temporary
price movements, in contrast to micro-level cross-sectional or panel stud-
ies centered on trade liberalization episodes.
32 In taking η=2, we try, in a
crude way, to address these biases while also recognizing the empirically
inspired rules of thumb that inform policymakers’ forecasts. We also include
an illustrative simulation of the case η=100 (in which all traded goods
are essentially perfect substitutes). That simulation shuts down the terms-
of-trade effects and thereby shows how large a role is being played by 
substitution between traded and nontraded goods, the channel we have
emphasized elsewhere.
33
We set both α and δ equal to 0.7; these are the consumption weights
that Americans and Europeans, on the one hand, and Asians, on the other,
attach to their own domestic products within their traded goods consump-
tion baskets. That choice is plausible based on our discussion in an earlier
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29. Examples are the estimates of Feenstra (1994) and the more recent ﬁgures of Broda
and Weinstein (2004).
30. Orcutt (1950).
31. For an excellent example of this bias in action, see Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez
(2000), who report that, because oil and tourism demand are relatively price-inelastic, trade
equations based on aggregates that include oil and services imply apparently much lower
price elasticities than equations for nonoil manufactures only. For the Group of Seven
countries, Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez report short-run price elasticities for imports and
exports (including oil and services) that in most cases do not satisfy the Marshall-Lerner
condition. We view the elasticities implied even by aggregated estimates that exclude oil
and services as unreasonably low; but, if they are accurate, they imply larger terms-of-trade
and real exchange rate effects of international spending shifts.
32. See Ruhl (2003). Our model omits not only dynamics of the type suggested by
Ruhl, but also those resulting from the introduction of new product varieties, which would
act over the longer run to dampen the extent to which a rise in a country’s relative produc-
tivity lowers its terms of trade. See, for example, Krugman (1989) and Gagnon (2003).
33. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a).paper.34 We set β=0.8, implying that Europe and the United States alike
place weights of β−α=0.1 on each other’s traded goods, and twice that
weight (0.2) on Asian goods. Asia, by assumption, distributes its demand
evenly across the other two regions (placing a weight of 0.15 on the exports
of each). So, in our model, Europe and the United States both trade more
with Asia than with each other. We assume that all three regions produce
the same number of units of tradable goods output.
Appendix A discusses in detail our assumptions regarding gross liabil-
ities and assets for each region, as well as the currencies of denomination
of these stocks. The point we stress here is that, to a ﬁrst approximation,
the United States is a net debtor (to the tune of 25 percent of its GDP, or
100 percent of its exportable GDP), and greater Europe has approximately
a zero net international position. Our model’s third region, Asia, therefore
is left as a net international creditor in an amount equal to 100 percent of
U.S. tradable GDP. U.S. gross foreign liabilities are almost all in dollars,
but U.S. gross foreign assets are only about 40 percent in dollars. We
assume that greater Asia’s gross liabilities are equally divided among U.S.,
European, and Asian currencies (because Japan borrows in yen), whereas
Asian gross foreign assets are 80 percent in dollars and 20 percent in
European currencies. For Europe we assume that gross foreign assets are
32 percent in dollars, 11 percent in Asian currencies, and 57 percent in
European currencies. In our model, 80 percent of European gross liabili-
ties are denominated in European currencies, and the balance in dollars.
These numbers are very rough approximations, based in some cases on
fragmentary or impressionistic data, but portfolio shares can shift sharply
over time, and so there is little point in trying too hard to reﬁne the esti-
mates. As we shall see, these shares do imply large potential international
redistributions of wealth due to exchange rate changes, but those redistri-
butions themselves have only a secondary impact on the exchange rate
implications of current account adjustment.
For nominal interest rates we take a baseline value of 3.75 percent a year
for U.S. liabilities but 5 percent a year for all other countries’ liabilities.
This assumption captures the “exorbitant privilege” the United States has
long enjoyed of borrowing from the world more cheaply than it lends.
35
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34. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b).
35. The phrase “exorbitant privilege” is commonly but wrongly attributed to French
president Charles de Gaulle. For its true origin, see the interesting historical note provided
by Gourinchas and Rey (2005b).Turning to current accounts, we place the U.S. external deﬁcit at 20 per-
cent of U.S. tradable GDP.
36 This is consistent with a U.S. current account
deﬁcit of 5 percent of total GDP, a reasonable baseline if part of the 2004
deﬁcit is due to temporarily high oil prices. Because we ﬁnd our simula-
tion results to be approximately linear within the parameter space we are
considering, it is easy to adjust the prediction to the case in which the
2004 deﬁcit of 6 percent of GDP persists. In any event, what matters most
for our calibration is how much the current account balance adjusts (for
example, from 6 to 3 percent of GDP). We assume an initial position with
Europe’s current account surplus at 5 percent of U.S. tradable GDP and
Asia’s at 15 percent.
37
A ﬁnal benchmark to establish is our initial reference value for measur-
ing subsequent exchange rate adjustments. This issue was less critical in our
earlier two papers, because trade-weighted effective exchange rates move
more slowly than the bilateral exchange rates that we consider below. In our
basic model prices are ﬂexible and economic responses to them are imme-
diate. In practice, however, there are considerable lags: Michael Mussa, for
example, posits the rule of thumb that the U.S. trade balance responds with
a two-year lag to dollar exchange rate changes.
38 In that case, if today’s cur-
rent account balances reﬂect averages of exchange rates over the past two
years, it would be more accurate to think of our simulations as giving
exchange rate changes relative to two-year average reference rates rather
than current rates. Table 2 presents some resulting reference exchange
rates. (The Chinese and Malaysian currencies have been pegged over the
past two years, and so their current and average rates are the same.)
Simulations
With the model and our parameter assumptions in hand, we are ready to
consider alternative simulations. Underlying much of our analysis is the
assumption that demand shocks (such as a rise in U.S. saving) are driving
the redistribution of global imbalances. This seems by far the most realis-
tic assumption, given the magnitude of the external ﬁnancing gaps.
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36. As noted earlier, we estimate tradable GDP to be at most 25 percent of total GDP.
37. It would be interesting and useful to extend the model to include emerging markets
and OPEC as a composite fourth region, as suggested by our discussant T. N. Srinivasan.
38. Mussa (2005).Tables 3 through 6 lay out the results of three scenarios under which the
U.S. current account balance might improve by 20 percent of tradable
GDP or, equivalently, 5 percent of total GDP. (All simulations include the
effect of exchange rate changes in revaluing the regions’ foreign assets and
liabilities.) In the “global rebalancing” scenario (the ﬁrst column in each
table), all regions’ current account balances go to zero (with trade balances
adjusting as needed to service interest ﬂows on the endogenously deter-
mined stocks of net foreign assets). Looking ﬁrst at bilateral real exchange
rates, in table 3, we see that Asia’s exchange rate with the United States
rises by 35.2 percent, and Europe’s rises by 28.6 percent (we deﬁne the
real exchange rate such that these changes indicate real depreciations of
the dollar). Europe sees an improvement in its terms of trade against the
United States (a rise in the price of Europe’s exports relative to its U.S.
imports) of 14.0 percent, and Asia sees an improvement of 14.5 percent.
What are the implications for nominal exchange rates? To answer this
question we must specify monetary policies. We consider two possibili-
ties: that central banks stabilize the domestic CPI, and that they stabilize
the domestic GDP deﬂator. Table 4 reports the results. Under CPI target-
ing, the monetary authorities hold overall price levels constant, so that the
only source of real exchange rate change is nominal exchange rate change.
As a result, nominal and real exchange rate changes are equal, as can be
seen by comparing table 4 with table 3.
39 Because none of the three regions
is extremely open to trade, movements in CPIs and in GDP deﬂators are
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39. We provide a detailed account of nominal exchange rate determination under GDP
deﬂator targeting at www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/papers/BPEA2005.pdf.
Table 2. Recent and Two-Year-Average Exchange Rates of Selected Currencies
Currency units per dollar except where noted otherwise
Exchange rate
Currency As of June 1, 2005 Two-year average
U.K. pound sterling
a 1.81 1.79
Canadian dollar 1.25 1.23
Euro
a 1.22 1.23
Korean won 1,010 1,129
New Taiwan dollar 31.30 33.21
Singapore dollar 1.67 1.69
Japanese yen 108.4 109.3
Source: Federal Reserve data.
a. In dollars per indicated currency unit.Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 99
Table 3. Changes in Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade Following U.S.
Current Account Adjustment under Baseline Assumptions
a
Log change × 100
Adjustment scenario
Real exchange rate  Global  Bretton  Europe and United 
or terms of trade rebalancingb Woods IIc States trade placesd
Real exchange rate
United States/Europe 28.6 58.5 44.6
United States/Asia 35.2 −0.5 19.4
Europe/Asia 6.7 −59.0 −25.2
Terms of trade
United States/Europe 14.0 29.4 22.0
United States/Asia 14.5 7.2 11.1
Europe/Asia 0.5 −22.2 −10.8
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. Exchange rates are deﬁned such that an increase represents a real depreciation of the ﬁrst region’s currency against the sec-
ond’s; terms of trade are deﬁned such that an increase represents a deterioration for the ﬁrst region (that is, a fall in the price of
the ﬁrst region’s export good against the second). Assumed parameter values are as follows: substitution elasticity between traded
and nontraded goods θ=1; substitution elasticity between traded goods of different regions η=2; share of traded goods in total
consumption γ=0.25.
b. Current account balances of all three regions go to zero.
c. Asia’s current account surplus rises to keep its exchange rate with the dollar ﬁxed. Europe’s current account absorbs all
changes in the U.S. and Asian current accounts.
d. Europe absorbs the entire improvement in the U.S. current account balance while Asia’s current account balance remains
unchanged.
Table 4. Changes in Nominal Exchange Rates Following U.S. Current Account
Adjustment under Alternative Inﬂation Targets
a
Log change × 100
Adjustment scenario
Nominal Global  Bretton  Europe  and  United 
exchange rate rebalancing Woods II States trade places
Target is consumer price index
b
United States/Europe 28.6 58.5 44.6
United States/Asia 35.2 −0.5 19.4
Europe/Asia 6.7 −59.0 −25.2
Target is GDP deﬂator
United States/Europe 30.0 61.4 46.8
United States/Asia 36.9 0.0 20.6
Europe/Asia 6.9 −61.4 −26.3
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange rates, scenarios, and parameter assumptions.
b. With ﬂexible prices and CPI targeting by central banks, nominal exchange rate changes are equal to the real exchange rate
changes reported in table 3.100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
Table 5. Changes in Real and Nominal Effective (Trade-Weighted) Exchange Rates
Following U.S. Current Account Adjustment under Baseline Assumptions
a
Log change × 100
Adjustment scenario
Effective Global  Bretton  Europe and United 
exchange rate
b rebalancing Woods II States trade places
U.S. real −33.0 −19.1 −27.8
U.S. nominal −34.6 −20.5 −29.3
Europe real 5.1 58.9 31.7
Europe nominal 5.4 61.4 33.1
Asia real 20.9 −29.8 −2.9
Asia nominal 21.9 −30.7 −2.9
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of scenarios and parameter assumptions. An increase is an appreciation of the indicated currency
against foreign currencies.
b. Nominal exchange rate changes are calculated under the assumption of GDP deﬂator targeting; see appendix A for details.
fairly close, and, as a result, nominal exchange rate changes when the GDP
deﬂator is stabilized differ very little from those under CPI stabilization.
The appreciation of Europe’s currencies against the dollar is smaller
than that of Asia’s under the ﬁrst scenario, because Asia starts out in our
simulation with a much larger external surplus than Europe does, and so it
has more adjusting to do. But the Asian currencies’ appreciation against the
dollar is mitigated somewhat by the fact that Asia trades more with the United
States than Europe does.
40 We see in table 5 that Europe’s real effective
currency appreciation—represented, as is traditional for such multilateral
indexes, by a positive number—is much smaller than Asia’s: only 5.1 percent
versus 20.9 percent. Again, this reﬂects the greater weight of the dollar in
Asia’s trade-weighted real exchange rate than in Europe’s. Notice that, as
in table 4, nominal (under GDP deﬂator targeting) and real effective
exchange rate changes are again quite close numerically.
Another factor underlying the equilibrium exchange rate responses is that
dollar depreciation implies a much bigger reduction in Asia’s net foreign
asset position than in Europe’s. (Table 6 shows the impacts under GDP
40. Indeed, if one recalibrates the model so that β=0.85 (in which case all countries’
preferences are completely symmetric, so that Europeans and Americans no longer prefer
Asian goods to each other’s), then, in the global rebalancing scenario, Asia’s currency
appreciates in real terms against the dollar by 37.8 percent and against European currencies
by 12.2 percent. These numbers exceed the 35.2 percent and 6.7 percent reported in table 3.deﬂator targeting.) Asia has 80 percent of its assets, but only 34 percent of
its liabilities, in dollars. Thus, under the global rebalancing scenario, dol-
lar depreciation raises Asia’s gross liabilities relative to its gross assets,
pushing its net foreign assets down (as a fraction of U.S. tradable GDP)
by 60 percent. Europe, by contrast, has only 32 percent of its assets and
20 percent of its liabilities in dollars. The fact that Asia loses so much on
the asset side implies that its trade surplus shrinks by less than its current
account surplus does. Because trade surpluses are what drive the constel-
lation of real exchange rates, the real appreciation of the Asian currencies
is mitigated. In sum, thanks to Asia’s greater openness and to the fact that
Asia suffers particularly large capital losses on foreign assets when the
dollar falls, Asian exchange rates do not need to change quite as much as
a model-free, back-of-the-envelope calculation might suggest.
The tables cover two other possible scenarios. The second column in
tables 3 through 6 analyzes a “Bretton Woods II” scenario, in which Asia
clings to its dollar peg.
41 We calibrate this case by setting the U.S. current
account balance to zero and endogenously varying Asia’s and Europe’s
current account balances in a way that both maintains Asia’s bilateral
nominal exchange rate with the United States (assuming GDP deﬂator tar-
geting) and absorbs the fall in U.S. borrowing. (Of course, nonmonetary
policy instruments such as ﬁscal policy would have to be used to attain
just the right constellation of current account balances.) In this case the
bilateral real exchange rates of the European currencies against the dollar
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Table 6. Net Foreign Assets by Region Following U.S. Current Account Adjustment
a




foreign asset  Global  Bretton  Europe and United 
Region position rebalancing Woods II States trade places
United States −1.0 −0.3 −0.1 −0.2
Europe 0.0 −0.1 −0.7 −0.4
Asia 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.6
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange rates, scenarios, and parameter assumptions.
b. Net asset positions taking into account valuation effects of changes in nominal exchange rates under GDP deﬂator targeting.
41. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004a, 2000b).must rise spectacularly, by 58.5 percent, and they would rise against the
Asian currencies by 59 percent. This result also is approximately linear in
the change in the U.S. current account balance. Thus, under the Bretton
Woods II scenario, eliminating only half the U.S. current account deﬁcit
would raise the real value of the European currencies against the dollar by
as much as would occur in a global rebalancing scenario that eliminates
the U.S. current account deﬁcit entirely.
For Asia to maintain its nominal exchange rate peg in the face of a bal-
anced U.S. current account, it must drive its own current account balance
signiﬁcantly further into surplus, from 15 percent to 31 percent of U.S.
tradable GDP. And Europe would have to move from a surplus equal to
5 percent of U.S. tradable GDP to a 31 percent deﬁcit! (See the footnotes
to table 3.) When Asia pegs its currencies to a falling dollar, its own
traded goods become more competitive and its imports more expensive
relative to domestic nontraded goods. Both factors shift world demand away
from Europe, which, by assumption, is passively absorbing the blow, and
toward Asia. These calibrations make patently clear why sustaining Asia’s
dollar peg is likely to be politically unpalatable for many of its trading
partners if the U.S. current account deficit ever shrinks. Asia would be
extremely vulnerable to a protectionist backlash.
As table 6 shows, the sharp appreciation of Europe’s currencies in the
Bretton Woods II scenario also decimates its external asset position,
which declines from balance to −70 percent of the value of U.S. tradable
production. Asia suffers somewhat, and the U.S. net asset position is the
major beneficiary, because U.S.-owned foreign assets are concentrated
in European currencies. Europe is thus hammered both by a sharp
decline in its competitiveness and by a loss on its net foreign assets of
about $2 trillion.
The third scenario reported in tables 3 through 6 is a muted version of
the Bretton Woods II scenario. Here, instead of maintaining its dollar cur-
rency peg, Asia maintains its current account surplus unchanged in the
face of U.S. adjustment to a balanced position. That is, rather than increas-
ing its current account surplus, it allows enough exchange rate adjustment
to keep the surplus constant. In this case, as table 5 shows, Europe’s real
effective exchange rate rises by much less than in the Bretton Woods II
scenario (31.7 percent versus 58.9 percent), and the Asian currencies expe-
rience a real effective depreciation of only 2.9 percent, versus 29.8 per-
cent in Bretton Woods II. Still, because the U.S. current account balance
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in real terms by 19.4 percent against the dollar (table 3). This exercise
reveals a fallacy in the argument that Asia cannot allow its dollar peg to
move without losing the ability to absorb its surplus labor. To the extent
that European demand increases, Asia can retain its external surplus while
releasing its dollar peg.
In table 7 we revisit the global rebalancing scenario but vary the critical
substitution elasticities in the model. (Only real exchange rate changes,
which equal nominal changes under CPI inﬂation targeting, are listed.) In
the ﬁrst column we assume an elasticity of substitution between traded
and nontraded goods, θ, of 2 instead of 1. As we have already argued, the
limited evidence in the empirical macroeconomics literature suggests that
this estimate is well on the high side, but it allows us to incorporate a more
conservative range of potential exchange rate adjustments alongside our
baseline estimates. Under this assumption the real dollar exchange rate
with the European currencies rises by only 19.3 percent, instead of 28.6
percent as in the ﬁrst column of table 3, and the Asian currencies rise
against the dollar by 22.5 percent instead of 35.2 percent. The dollar falls
in real effective terms (results not shown) by 21.5 percent rather than 
33 percent. These calculations show that, even with a relatively high value
for θ, the required adjustment of exchange rates is quite signiﬁcant even
if, as here, prices are ﬂexible.
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Table 7. Changes in Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade in the Global
Rebalancing Scenario under Alternative Calibrations
a
Log change × 100
Higher elasticity of  Very high elasticity of 
substitution between traded  substitution between 
Real exchange rate  and nontraded goods  regions’ traded goods 
or terms of trade (θ=2, η=2) (θ=1, η=100)
Real exchange rate
United States/Europe 19.3 16.5
United States/Asia 22.5 23.5
Europe/Asia 3.3 7.0
Terms of trade
United States/Europe 14.6 0.0
United States/Asia 15.1 0.0
Europe/Asia 0.5 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. In the global rebalancing scenario all regions’ current account balances go to zero. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange
rates and other parameter assumptions.The second column in table 7 examines the case in which θ=1 but η=
100, so that the various countries’ tradable outputs are almost perfect sub-
stitutes. This exercise, which essentially eliminates terms-of-trade adjust-
ments as a factor in moving real exchange rates, allows us to see how much
of the change in exchange rates is due to within-country substitution
between traded and nontraded goods. This variation mutes the exchange
rate changes by an amount roughly similar to those found in the previous
exercise. The real effective dollar exchange rate (again not shown) falls by
21 percent. According to this calibration, roughly two-thirds of the needed
dollar adjustment is driven by substitution between traded and nontraded
goods, and only one-third is driven by the terms-of-trade channel typi-
cally emphasized in the literature. This should not be surprising, given that
(according to our previously cited calibration) roughly 75 percent of GDP
is nontraded. With more conservative assumptions about international trade,
however (either greater home bias in consumption or lower substitutability
of countries’ traded outputs, such that η=1), the terms-of-trade channel
would become more important.
At present the United States is absorbing traded goods (domestic and
foreign) equivalent to roughly 30 percent of its GDP. This demand needs to
adjust downward while avoiding a reduction in nontraded goods absorption
if full employment is to be maintained; such a shift will therefore require
a signiﬁcant change in the relative price of nontraded goods. Still, terms-
of-trade changes do account for about one-third of the overall adjustment,
a proportion slightly larger than that found in our two-country model,
where we did not allow for trade or terms-of-trade adjustments between
non-U.S. economies.
Given the United States’ leveraged international portfolio, with gross
debts mostly in dollars and assets signiﬁcantly in foreign currencies, an
unexpected dollar depreciation reduces the U.S. net foreign debt. The ﬁrst
two columns of table 8 report the results of simulations, within the global
rebalancing scenario, that illustrate the quantitative importance of such
asset valuation effects. Gourinchas and Rey have recently estimated that
nearly one-third of the settlement of the U.S. net foreign debt has histori-
cally been effected by valuation changes, with the remaining two-thirds
covered by higher net exports.
42 The ﬁrst column in table 8 shows results
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42. Gourinchas and Rey (2005a).for the global rebalancing scenario with valuation effects taken into account
(identical to the ﬁrst column in table 3). The second column shows the
changes in bilateral exchange rates that would be required if there were no
valuation effects (or, equivalently, if exchange rate changes were accu-
rately anticipated and nominal returns adjusted fully to compensate). All
relative price changes against the United States are larger in this case,
because the United States does not get the beneﬁt of a sharp reduction in
its net dollar liabilities. Correspondingly, the U.S. trade balance needs to
adjust more for any given adjustment in the current account deﬁcit. The
real exchange rate between the dollar and the European currencies needs
to move by 33.7 percent, rather than 28.6 percent when valuation effects
are taken into account, and the real value of the Asian currencies needs to
rise by 40.7 percent against the dollar instead of 35.2 percent. The real
effective dollar exchange rate falls by 37.8 percent instead of 33.0 per-
cent (results not shown). According to these numbers, asset revaluation
effects will mute the required movement in exchange rates as the U.S.
current account closes up, but the trade balance has to do the heavy lift-
ing, since 87 percent (33.0 ÷ 37.8) of the necessary real exchange rate
adjustment remains. That valuation effects have only a secondary effect
on equilibrium relative price changes is not surprising: big valuation
effects can only come from big exchange rate movements.
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Table 8. Changes in Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade in the Global
Rebalancing Scenario with and without Valuation and Interest Rate Effects
a
Log change × 100
With valuation  Without valuation  With valuation 
Real exchange rate  effects and without  effects or interest  effects and interest 
or terms of trade interest rate effects
b rate effects rate effects
c
Real exchange rate
United States/Europe 28.6 33.7 30.1
United States/Asia 35.2 40.7 37.2
Europe/Asia 6.7 7.0 6.3
Terms of trade
United States/Europe 14.0 16.5 15.1
United States/Asia 14.5 16.5 15.3
Europe/Asia 0.5 0.0 0.2
Source: Authors’ calculations using the model described in the text.
a. In the global rebalancing scenario all regions’ current account balances go to zero. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange
rates and other parameter assumptions.
b. Same as the baseline scenario reported in ﬁrst column of table 3.
c. Interest rates on U.S. short-term liabilities held by foreigners are assumed to rise 1.25 percentage points, to the same level as
the return earned by U.S. residents abroad.Our calculations so far do not take into account the likelihood of an
accompanying rise in global interest rates, which would hurt the United States
(a net debtor) and help Asia (a net creditor). A broad range of scenarios
are possible here; we examine only a single very simple one. (Appendix A
gives details of the calculation.) In the third column of table 8, we assume
that annual interest rates on short-term U.S. debt rise from 3.75 percent to
5 percent, the same level assumed for all other liabilities. In other words,
perhaps because of heightened risk perceptions, the United States simply
loses its historical low borrowing rate and is put on a par with other debtors.
This change wipes out a good deal of the effect of the valuation changes
(and would wipe out even more if it applied to all U.S. external liabilities,
not just the roughly 30 percent consisting of short-maturity debt). As our
introductory discussion suggested, the United States, as an important issuer
of bonds relative to equity, is extremely vulnerable to increases in interest
rates, even when all global bond rates rise together.
Until now we have been concentrating on demand shocks. Productivity
shocks may make the adjustment process more or less difﬁcult, depending
on their source. Higher productivity in foreign traded goods production
can actually result in an even greater real depreciation of the dollar as
equilibrium is reestablished in world markets. If, on the other hand, it is
nontraded goods productivity in Asia and Europe that rises, the exchange
rate effects of global rebalancing will be muted. As table 9 illustrates, a
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Table 9. Changes in Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade in Global
Rebalancing Scenario with Higher Productivity in Non-U.S. Nontraded Goods
a
Log change × 100
With 20 percent increase in 
Real exchange rate  Without increase  productivity in European 
or terms of trade in productivityb and Asian nontraded goods
Real exchange rate
United States/Europe 28.6 17.0
United States/Asia 35.2 23.6
Europe/Asia 6.7 6.6
Terms of trade
United States/Europe 14.0 15.0
United States/Asia 14.5 15.3
Europe/Asia 0.5 0.2
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. In the global rebalancing scenario all regions’ current account balances go to zero. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange
rates and other parameter assumptions.
b. Same as the baseline scenario reported in the ﬁrst column of table 3.20 percent rise in nontraded goods productivity outside the United States
implies notably smaller real exchange rate changes, although the terms-of-
trade shifts are similar. A large rise in U.S. traded goods productivity would
also facilitate a softer landing. In this case, however, although the extent
of real dollar depreciation is somewhat reduced, the U.S. terms of trade
fall much more sharply (results not reported).
Some Further Considerations
We believe our model offers many useful insights, but of course there are
many caveats to its interpretation. Some of these suggest that our results
understate the dollar’s potential decline, and some that they overstate it.
Intersectoral Factor Mobility
A critical implicit assumption of our model is that capital and labor
cannot quickly migrate across sectors, so that prices rather than quantities
must bear the burden of adjustment in response to any sudden change in
relative demands for different goods. This assumption seems entirely rea-
sonable if global current account adjustment (full or partial) takes place
moderately quickly, say, over one to two years. In the short run, workers
cannot change location easily, worker retraining is expensive, and a great
deal of capital is sector-speciﬁc. Over much longer periods, however (say,
ten to twelve years), factor mobility is considerable. If, for example,
prices rise dramatically in the U.S. traded goods sector, new investment
will be skewed toward that sector, as will new employment. Thus, in prin-
ciple, a gradual closing of the U.S. current account deﬁcit would facilitate
much smoother adjustment with less exchange rate volatility. Unfortu-
nately, our model is not explicitly dynamic.
43 One can, however, artiﬁ-
cially approximate gradual current account adjustment by allowing for
progressively higher elasticities of substitution. We do this in table 10,
where we reconsider our central scenario (which assumed θ=1 and η=2)
by comparing it with two cases in which substitution elasticities are much
higher. As the table shows, in the case with “gradual” unwinding (proxied
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43. For an example of a dynamic approach see the small-country q-model analysis in
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 4).by θ=2 and η=4), which we loosely take to capture a ﬁve- to seven-year
adjustment horizon, the bilateral exchange rate changes involving the dol-
lar are only about half as big as in our central global rebalancing scenario.
For a “very gradual” unwinding (which we take to occur over ten to twelve
years, with θ=4 and η=8), the same real exchange rate changes are less
than a quarter as large as in the central scenario.
Sticky Prices
Factor mobility kicks in to smooth current account adjustment if the
adjustment is slow and relatively well anticipated. If, on the other hand,
current account imbalances have to close up very quickly (say, because of
a collapse in U.S. housing prices), the bias in our estimates would point in
the other direction. Nominal rigidities in prices would then play a large
role, and actual exchange rate movements would likely be two or more
times as large as in our central scenario, for several reasons.
44
For one thing, our model assumes that the law of one price holds for
traded goods, whereas in fact at most half of an exchange rate adjustment
typically passes through to traded goods prices even after one year.
45 Thus,
in order to balance supply and demand for the different categories of goods
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44. See the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a).
45. P. Goldberg and Knetter (1997); Campa and L. Goldberg (2002). For recent evi-
dence suggesting a substantial decline in pass-through to U.S. import prices, see Marazzi
and others (2005).
Table 10. Changes in Real Exchange Rates under Alternative Assumed Speeds of
Global Rebalancing
a
Log change × 100
Speed
b
Moderate Gradual  Very  gradual 
Real exchange rate (1–2 years)
c (5–7 years) (10–12 years)
United States/Europe 28.6 13.4 6.5
United States/Asia 35.2 17.3 8.5
Europe/Asia 6.7 3.9 2.0
Source: Authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
a. In the global rebalancing scenario all regions’ current account balances go to zero. See table 3 for deﬁnitions of exchange
rates and other parameter assumptions.
b. Proxied by varying elasticities of substitution: moderate, θ=1, η=2; gradual, θ=2, η=4; very gradual, θ=4, η=8.
c. Same as the baseline scenario reported in the ﬁrst column of table 3.while maintaining full employment, central banks would have to allow
much larger exchange rate movements—possibly double those suggested
by the model. These larger movements would be “overshoots” in the sense
that they would unwind over time as domestic prices adjust.
The nominal prices of nontraded goods are typically even stickier than
those of traded goods; this further ampliﬁes the overshooting effect. In
general, both sticky prices and slow factor mobility point toward the like-
lihood that a slow unwinding of the U.S. current account deﬁcit will lead
to smaller changes in real exchange rates than would a relatively abrupt
correction.
Rising U.S. Interest Rates and the Dollar
Another qualiﬁcation to our results is that our model does not account
for ﬁnancial factors, and in particular for the possibility of temporarily
high real interest rates in the United States muting the dollar’s decline.
Using the Federal Reserve’s macroeconomic model, David Reifschneider,
Robert Tetlow, and John Williams estimate that a 1-percentage-point rise
in the federal funds rate (presumably unmatched by the rest of the world)
leads to a 2.2 percent appreciation of the dollar after one year, and a 4.9 per-
cent appreciation after two years.
46 Therefore the fact that, over the past
year, U.S. short-term interest rates have been rising relative to Europe’s is
a countervailing consideration to those discussed above (although our cal-
culations suggest that it is likely to be far less important quantitatively). In
addition, Europe and Asia can always choose to lower their interest rates
to further mute the dollar’s decline. Of course, interest rate policy can
only affect the dollar’s real value temporarily, and so long-term global
rebalancing will still require a combination of real exchange rate adjust-
ment and factor reallocation across sectors.
The Fundamental Unpredictability of Exchange Rates
Our model suggests that the gaping U.S. current account deﬁcit is a
very large negative factor in assessing the future prospects of the dollar. It
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46. Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999). A back-of-the-envelope calculation
based on the Dornbusch overshooting model (Dornbusch, 1976) yields a similar result.is well known, however, that it is extremely difﬁcult to explain exchange
rate swings between major currencies, much less forecast them, at least at
horizons up to eighteen months.47 Although a number of small qualiﬁca-
tions must be made to this result,48 it remains broadly true. How, then, can
one be concerned about a medium-term dollar decline if a rise is equally
likely? There are two broad answers to this question. First, even the most
cheery U.S. current account optimist would have to concede that an abrupt
reversal is a potential risk, particularly while federal government deﬁcits
remain less than fully tamed. Reversal need not result from what Guillermo
Calvo, in the context of emerging markets, has called a “sudden stop” of
capital inﬂows;49 as we have noted, it could follow, for example, from a
rise in U.S. saving due to a purely domestic asset price collapse. Our cal-
ibrations are useful in laying out the exchange rate consequences and in
illuminating how the burden of adjustment might be shared among the
major economies.
Second, and more fundamentally, there is some evidence that nonlin-
earities are also important, so that, when exchange rates are particularly
far out of line with one or more fundamentals, some predictability emerges.
Obstfeld and Alan Taylor, for example, argue that convergence to pur-
chasing power parity is much more important quantitatively when a cur-
rency is relatively heavily over- or undervalued compared with its long-term
real exchange rate.50 Gourinchas and Rey argue that, contrary to the canon-
ical Meese-Rogoff result, there is a forecastable component to trade-
weighted dollar exchange rate movements when net foreign assets or
debts are large relative to the United States’ net export base.51 Their work
supports much earlier work by Peter Hooper and John Morton suggesting
that net foreign assets may be important in explaining dollar move-
ments.52 As we argued in the introduction, the U.S. current account deﬁcit
today is so large and unprecedented that it is difﬁcult to project its future
path and the consequences thereof simply by extrapolating from past data.
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47. Meese and Rogoff (1983).
48. See the survey in Frankel and Rose (1995), for example.
49. Calvo (1998).
50. Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
51. Gourinchas and Rey (2005a).
52. Hooper and Morton (1982).Conclusions
We have developed a simple stylized model that can be used to cali-
brate exchange rate changes in response to various scenarios under which
the U.S. current account deﬁcit might be reduced from its unprecedented
current level. Aside from its quantitative predictions, the model yields a
number of important qualitative insights.
First, Asia’s greater openness to trade implies that the requisite exchange
rate adjustments for that region are not all that much greater than Europe’s.
This appears true despite the fact that Asia starts from a much larger current
account surplus than Europe.
Second, we ﬁnd that, if Asia tries to stick to its dollar peg in the face of,
say, a rise in the U.S. saving rate that closes up the U.S. current account gap
even partly, Asia will actually have to run signiﬁcantly larger surpluses
than it does now. Europe would bear the brunt of this policy, ending up with
a current account deﬁcit even larger than that of the United States today,
while at the same time suffering a huge loss on its net foreign assets.
Third, although dollar depreciation does tend to improve the U.S. net
foreign asset position (because virtually all of its gross foreign liabilities,
but less than half of its gross foreign assets, are denominated in dollars), this
effect only slightly mitigates the requisite exchange rate change. Valuation
effects will not rescue the United States from a huge trade balance adjust-
ment. Indeed, if relative interest rates on U.S. short-term debt rise even
moderately during the adjustment process, this adverse effect could easily
cancel out any gain due to valuation effects.
Fourth, our model suggests that the need for deﬁcit countries to shift
demand toward nontraded goods (and for surplus countries to shift demand
away from them) is roughly twice as important quantitatively as the much
more commonly stressed terms-of-trade channel (which involves substi-
tution between the traded goods produced by different countries). The
importance of the terms of trade would be greater with lower international
trade elasticities than we have assumed, or with a greater degree of home
bias in consumption.
We have only scratched the surface of the possible questions that can be
asked within our framework. To that end, we have tried to make our approach
as transparent as possible so that other researchers can easily investigate
alternative scenarios using the model. Clearly, it would be interesting to
extend the model in many dimensions, in particular to allow for sticky
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 111prices and for dynamic adjustments, such as factor movement across sec-
tors. It would also be interesting to extend the framework to allow for
more regions of the world economy, for example, oil producers, non-Asian
emerging markets, and Asian subregions. Nonetheless, in a literature that
is often long on polemics and short on analysis, we hope it is useful to
have a concrete model on which to base policy evaluation.
APPENDIX A
Equilibrium Prices, Revaluation Effects, and Interest 
Rate Effects
Equilibrium Prices
Here we show how real exchange rates depend on equilibrium relative
prices, and we spell out the relevant equilibrium conditions for our three-
region world economy. By deﬁnition, real exchange rates depend on rela-
tive international prices for both traded and nontraded goods. We take up
relative traded goods prices ﬁrst.
As the text noted, notwithstanding the law of one price, the assumed
internationally asymmetric preferences over tradables permit relative
regional price indexes for tradable consumption to vary over time. Instead
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112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005Thus shifts in interregional real exchange rates q reﬂect both shifts in
the relative prices of traded and nontraded goods and shifts in the relative
prices of exports and imports:
Having deﬁned relative price indexes, one can easily derive global market-
clearing conditions for each region’s tradable output, again using very
standard techniques for constant elasticity of substitution models such as
the one we have here.
53 For real U.S. tradable goods output, the market-
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53. As illustrated, for example, in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).and that for real European traded goods output is given by
Walras’ Law implies that the condition for Asian traded goods equilib-
rium is superﬂuous, given the two others. One can similarly derive the
market-clearing condition for U.S. nontraded goods as
(which depends, of course, only on U.S. demand), as well as the two cor-
responding conditions for European and Asian nontraded goods.
We take output endowments as given, and we then use the market-
equilibrium conditions just stated to solve for relative prices as functions
of current account balances and initial net foreign asset positions. (In our
simulations we allow for currency revaluation effects on foreign assets and
liabilities, and for the feedback to trade balances needed to sustain any
given constellation of current accounts.)
To proceed, we ﬁrst rewrite the equilibrium condition for the U.S.
export good’s market as
or, in nominal terms, as
If trade were balanced and international debts zero, then, of course, the







































































































































































































114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005traded goods production. Here we want to allow for international debt as
well as for trade and current account imbalances (which are the same in
the model except for net factor payments). The U.S. current account sur-
plus in dollars is given by
where F
U is the stock of U.S. net foreign assets (in dollars) and r is the
nominal (dollar) rate of interest. Similarly, for Europe (and again measuring
in dollars),
In the aggregate, of course (in theory if not in the actual data),
Similarly,
Thus,
In this framework one can consider the effects of a variety of shocks
that change the current nexus of global current account imbalances into
one where, say, CA
U = 0. (Other external balance benchmarks can be ana-
lyzed just as easily.)
To do so, we use the above current account equations (and the implied
trade balances) to substitute for dollar values of consumption of traded
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Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 115Critically, current account imbalances also spill over into relative prices
for nontraded goods, to a degree that depends on the elasticity of substitution
between traded and nontraded goods. For the three nontraded goods mar-
kets, one can show that
Revaluation of Gross Asset Stocks through Exchange Rate Changes
A key variable in the simulation analysis is f
i, which is the ratio of net
foreign assets (in dollars), F
i, divided by the dollar traded goods income
of the United States, PUY
U
T. In reality, a country’s gross assets and liabili-
ties are often denominated in different currencies, so that focusing only
on the net position misses important revaluation effects that can occur as
the exchange rate changes. Here we show how we have modiﬁed our sim-
ulation analysis to take into account both the normalization of dollar net
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54. Details can be found online at www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/papers/
BPEA2005.pdf.Let H
i equal the gross assets of country i and L
i its gross liabilities,
measured in dollars. Then
and
One can show that, under a monetary policy that targets the GDP deﬂator,
The ﬁrst step is to substitute this formula for PU into the denominators
of  f
U,  f E, and f A. The second step is to consider how exchange rate
changes affect the numerators.
Let ω
i
j be the share of region i gross foreign assets denominated in the
currency of region j, j = U, E, A, where the European and (especially) the
Asian regional currencies are composites. Similarly, deﬁne the portfolio
currency shares λ
i
j on the liability side. We will assume that central banks
target GDP deﬂators and that EU, j denotes the (nominal) dollar price of
currency j (j = E, A) under the monetary rule. Then, after a change in
exchange rates, the new dollar values of net foreign assets (with values
























































































































































Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 117Note that the following two constraints must hold in a closed system:
So we can eliminate the European asset shares by writing the preceding as
post-change net asset values:
We also know that
For our numerical ﬁndings we must posit estimated values for nominal
assets and liabilities. Given the well-known measurement problems, any
numbers are bound to be loose approximations at best. For the United
States, the numbers we use are for end-2003 (from the 2005 Economic
Report of the President) and show foreign-owned assets in the United
States to be $10.5 trillion and U.S.-owned assets abroad to be $7.9 tril-
lion. We take the current values to be $11 trillion and $8.25 trillion,
respectively, for purposes of our simulations. To a ﬁrst approximation,
essentially all U.S. foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars, but only
about 40 percent of U.S. foreign assets are. (In principle, foreign assets
such as stocks and land are real, but in practice the dollar returns on these
() . A21 HHHLL L
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118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005assets are highly correlated with dollar exchange rate movements.) Of the
remaining 60 percent, we take 41 percent to be in European currencies
and 19 percent in Asian currencies. Following Tille (2004), and including
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland in region E, the United
States does have a very small share of its liabilities in foreign currencies.
The exact portfolio weights that we assume for the United States are
Drawing on the work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (but taking into
account the adding-up constraints that need to hold in our theoretical model),
we take Asia’s assets to be $11 trillion and its liabilities to be $8.25 trillion.
55
As for portfolio shares, on the asset side, data from the International
Monetary Fund’s 2001 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey suggest
that most Asian countries hold predominantly U.S. dollars (and some yen),
but that Japan’s foreign assets are more evenly balanced between dollar and
euro holdings. If we assume that Japan owns about 40 percent of the
region’s gross foreign assets, we have the following approximation:
On the liabilities side, Japan borrows in yen, but the other Asian
economies have equity liabilities (including foreign direct investment) in
local currencies, and extraregional debt liabilities predominantly in dollars
and euros (or sterling). We assume that
We again base our portfolio estimates for the E zone in our model on
the latest data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, which indicate that assets
and liabilities at the end of 2003 were both approximately $11 trillion.
Thus we take H
E = LE = $11 trillion. Most of greater Europe’s liabilities
are in domestic currencies; here we assume the share is 80 percent. We
take the remaining 20 percent to be entirely in U.S. dollars. On the asset
side, however, we derive from equation A19 that 32 percent of Europe’s
holdings are in dollar assets, and 11 percent in assets denominated in
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55. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (forthcoming).Asian currencies, with the remaining 57 percent in assets denominated in
European currencies.
56
In our simulations we take PUYU
T = $(11/4) trillion, based on Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000b), who argue that roughly one-quarter of U.S. GDP
may be regarded as traded.
Given our assumptions on each region’s gross assets and liabilities
and their currencies of denomination, our analysis will also tell us how
net foreign assets change across various scenarios for the current account
and the exchange rate, as well as allow for the feedback effect on interest
payments. We will see that, given the large size of gross stocks, large
changes in exchange rates can translate into large changes in net foreign
asset positions. Indeed, for many short-run and medium-run issues,
knowing the gross asset and liability positions is at least as important 
as understanding the net positions. This conclusion is very much in line
with the empirical findings of Gourinchas and Rey (2005a) for the
United States.
Effects of Changing Interest Rates
It seems plausible that, in the process of U.S. current account adjust-
ment, global interest rates will shift. Such changes could come about sim-
ply as a result of the reequilibration of the global capital market, or they
could also reflect a shift in the portfolio preferences of foreign investors
such that, given the exchange rate of the dollar, higher dollar interest
rates are necessary to persuade them to maintain their existing dollar-
denominated portfolio shares. We adopt the latter perspective, allowing
the interest rate on U.S. short-term debt liabilities to rise as the dollar
adjusts, without a corresponding increase in the earnings on U.S. foreign
assets. Capital market shifts of this nature are likely to be quantitatively
more important for the dollar than more generalized, synchronized
increases in world interest rates (although the United States, as a debtor,
would naturally lose while its creditors would gain).
To illustrate this channel, we ﬁrst, for simplicity, abstract from the effects
of nominal exchange rate changes on asset stocks (for the purpose of our
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56. The European position assumptions are not needed to implement equation A20, but
they are necessary for assessing the effects of interest rate changes below.simulations, this case is only a computation check). We focus on the sce-
nario under which, as the United States adjusts, it faces a sharp increase in
its borrowing rates. Thus there are two interest rates in the world econ-
omy: the rate r
U that the United States pays on its liabilities, and the rate
r
W > rU that all other countries pay on their liabilities and that all coun-
tries, including the United States, earn on assets outside the United States.
We focus on the implications of r
U rising when the United States adjusts;
the increase in r
U may itself have an effect on U.S. adjustment, although
that possibility does not affect our calculation.
There is also a long-run versus short-run distinction: in the short run only
U.S. short-term liabilities will pay higher interest (as these are rolled over).
According to U.S. Treasury data for September 2004 (from www.treas.
gov/tic/debta904.html), U.S. short-term liabilities were about 30 percent
of total liabilities (and thus about 30 percent of U.S. GDP). If the United
States were required to pay, for example, 200 basis points more on this
liability base, the result would be an additional drain of about 0.02 × 0.3 =
0.6 percent of total GDP.
Let ω ∼ i
j represent the share of country i gross foreign assets invested in
country j.
To make the previous modeling consistent, we replace rF
i everywhere
(for the United States, Europe, and Asia, respectively) by
From estimates described in the last subsection, we have the dollar values
of H
i and L
i. Asian currency shares probably exceed the Asian country
shares, because of Asian claims on offshore Eurodollars; we might assume
that ω ∼ A
U = 0.6. Since total U.S. liabilities equal the claims on the United
States of Europe and Asia,
and so, with H
E, H
A, and L
U each equal to $11 trillion, we must have
ω ∼E
U = 0.4.
We now turn to the calibration of interest rates (or, rather, nominal rates





U ≈ 0. Since, also, H
U/L
U ≈ 0.75, r
U/r
W ≈ 0.75.
() , A26    ωω U
EE
U









EW E W E
U
−






AW A W A rr H r L +− ( ) [] − 1   ω .
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 121So we take r
U = 3.75 percent initially,
57 but we maintain the earlier baseline
assumption that r
W = 5 percent. We ultimately wish to consider alternative
increases in r
U, for example, of 125 basis points or more. These possibili-
ties range from a scenario in which the United States simply loses its priv-
ilege of borrowing at a favorable rate, to some in which there is an element
of loss of conﬁdence in U.S. solvency absent ongoing dollar depreciation.
We will also assume that only the interest rate on short-term liabilities rises
in the short run. Suppose the share σ of short-term liabilities in total U.S.
foreign liabilities is 30 percent, or σ=0.3. Then the investment income
account of the United States and the other two regions would change as
follows:
The last two changes assume that, empirically, ω ∼E
U +ω ∼ A
U ≈ 1 and that Europe
and Asia hold equal proportions of short-term U.S. liabilities.
One might also consider a formulation where ∆rU = f(∆CAU), f′ > 0. In
this case adjustment could be quite painful if the f function is too rapidly
increasing, LU is too big, or σ is too big (or any combination of these three).
We leave this possibility for future research.
Synthesis of Interest Rate Changes and Asset Revaluations
We are now ready to illustrate the techniques used to calculate the
results in the third column in table 8, in which asset revaluations and
interest rate changes occur simultaneously and interactively. We proceed
as in the last section but add the following equations:
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57. This number is in line with the estimate given above of the excess return of U.S.
foreign assets over U.S. liabilities to foreigners.and
These equations, rather than the equations for net positions used in the
simpler revaluation exercise in which interest rates do not change, become
necessary because assets and liabilities can now pay different rates of
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Discussion
Richard N. Cooper: This paper by Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff
is very much a “what if” exercise. What if demand behaves according to
constant elasticity of substitution functions? What if consumption is ﬁxed,
apart from terms-of-trade effects? What if the U.S. current account deﬁcit
is eliminated (or, in one of the authors’ simulations, halved) by an appro-
priate increase in the U.S. saving rate? Then we learn from the authors’
model what the implied changes in exchange rates and the terms of trade
must be.
The authors’ calibration is necessarily arbitrary, but it seems reasonable.
A major contribution of their model is to provide a general equilibrium
framework that includes two stylized regions outside the United States. It
therefore permits an exploration of differing effects by region, and that seems
very useful. The model also includes asset revaluation effects and not just
trade effects.
The model assumes ﬂexible prices. As the authors note, it probably under-
states the exchange rate changes that would be required in a sticky-price
regime. The authors also usefully note the potentially ambiguous impact of
faster European or Japanese economic growth, which many people see as a
potential partial solution to the correction of the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
The source of the growth makes a difference, and one should not assume that
more-rapid growth abroad will ease the problem. Productivity increases in
traded goods, which is where such increases have typically occurred, espe-
cially in Japan, could aggravate rather than mitigate the imbalances.
No doubt it is interesting to see how large are the exchange rate changes
required to close the U.S. current account deﬁcit, but all the adjustment here
is done through prices, including the asset revaluation effect. Whether
that is helpful to policy is not at all clear to me. There is no explicit treat-
ment of output or employment in the model. The simulations are driven
124by a postulated increase in U.S. saving and a corresponding decline in or,
in most of the simulations, elimination of the U.S. current account deﬁcit,
so that presumably U.S. output is unaffected.
The paper’s simulations are, however, unclear about what is happening
to saving in the other two regions of the world as the U.S. external deﬁcit
is reduced. Their current account surpluses at the outset reﬂect excessive
saving in those two regions, and they disappear in the simulation in which
all three current accounts go to zero. But how do they disappear?
Consumption is assumed to be ﬁxed, except for the terms-of-trade effect.
The fall in saving in the paper’s simulated Europe and Asia therefore
implies a corresponding fall in output and income in order to get these
results. But a decline in output will surely affect employment, hence income,
hence consumption and saving, raising the question of how the initial level
of consumption is sustained in Asia and Europe. That in turn leaves me
wondering whether the paper provides any useful lessons for addressing the
issue of global imbalances in, say, the coming decade.
Let me offer, in sketchy terms, my own view of the issue. The discus-
sion of the U.S. current account deﬁcit has focused largely on how much
adjustment must occur in the United States. The authors’ model is properly
a general equilibrium model, and so it includes the rest of the world. I will
focus on adjustment in the rest of the world.
In 2004 the large current account surpluses in the world were in Japan,
at $172 billion, and in Germany and the Netherlands (which can be consid-
ered a satellite of the German economy) at $116 billion. Thus these three
countries together account for nearly half the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Russia and China together add another $130 billion. These are where the big
numbers are. Adding up all of the rest of East Asia accounts for another
$110 billion, and OPEC another $100 billion. Then there is the statistical
discrepancy, which has grown to about $200 billion.
There is, as always in ex post accounting, a problem of attribution, but
if we stipulate that the U.S. current account deﬁcit is to be eliminated, we
need to ask where the impact will fall in the rest of the world, and it has to
fall largely where the big surpluses are. (The present surpluses of emerging
economies could also shrink, or their deﬁcits grow, but that would require
a willingness on the part of savers around the world to invest in those
countries on the required scale, which is not a given. If all the adjustment
occurred there, their current account deﬁcits would have to rise far in excess
of generally accepted levels.)
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 125Like the authors, I will put oil to one side. The increase in oil prices over
the past two years has added roughly $100 billion to the U.S. current account
deﬁcit. I assume that, one way or another, either through a decline in oil
prices or through an increase in absorption by the oil-exporting countries,
their surpluses will decline signiﬁcantly in the next few years. Instead I
will focus on Germany and Japan, which, again, are where the really big
surpluses are, and then I will comment on China.
Germany and Japan are rapidly aging, high-saving societies with limited
domestic investment. Saving rates have declined in Japan, but saving in the
corporate sector remains quite high. What has fallen in Japan is investment,
which remains low even after a revival in the last year.
A big absorber of capital in rich countries is the residential sector. Invest-
ing in housing does not look very attractive in rapidly aging societies, with
very low birth rates and low new household formation, which is the case
in both of these countries. If anything, Germany and Japan have a surplus
of housing in the aggregate, although it may not all be in quite the right
places. Housing construction is down essentially to replacement plus a little
bit to allow for mobility. Meanwhile rates of return on industrial investment
are low and, of course, very sensitive to what is happening to the export
sector.
I will now make some sweeping (perhaps too sweeping) national gen-
eralizations. For reasons having to do with their defeat in World War II, a
key question for the Germans and the Japanese was how to rebuild their
national self-esteem. Both countries built it on export performance. That
legacy continues sixty years later. The national psyche in both Germany
and Japan is heavily inﬂuenced by export performance. If exports are not
doing well, people feel badly about the economy and society. In my view,
that inﬂuences their saving behavior. If the economy is not performing
well, precautionary saving rises in these now-rich countries.
Given the aging of their society, as the Japanese have been saying for
some years, Japanese saving should decline and eventually become nega-
tive. That may be so, but it has been a much slower process than the life
cycle advocates forecast twenty years ago. Saving remains remarkably high
given Japan’s demographic structure, and the same is true of Germany.
That syndrome, in which German and Japanese saving is sensitive to
perceived economic performance, which in turn is remarkably sensitive to
export performance, is important when it comes to correcting the U.S.
126 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005current account. If, as Obstfeld and Rogoff suggest, there will be big changes
in exchange rates and big declines in the export competitiveness of key sur-
plus countries, we are likely to see an increase, not a reduction, in the
propensity to save in those countries. Whether that increase gets translated
into actual additional saving depends, of course, on what happens to income.
The conditions just described are, after all, the conditions under which a
recession could occur. An increase in the propensity to save with no obvious
vehicle for that saving leads to a fall in output and income.
In the textbooks the adjustment mechanism in this process is the interest
rate, which is assumed to reconcile ex ante differences in saving and invest-
ment. Suppose the long-term nominal interest rate is only 2 percent, as it
has been in Japan for several years, and not much higher in Germany. The
question then becomes, What sort of investment in Japan and Germany will
be stimulated by a 2 percent interest rate, given the demographics, in the
presence or even with the prospect of a signiﬁcantly stronger yen and euro?
The sector most responsive to low interest rates in rich economies gener-
ally is the housing sector, not industrial investment. Firms will not invest
in increased capacity if they see poor sales prospects, no matter how low
the interest rate. Yet, for the demographic reasons already noted, demand
for housing will be limited, even at low long-term interest rates.
Hence I do not see the interest rate as being an effective adjuster here.
With a large appreciation of these surplus countries’ currencies, the adjuster
is more likely to be economic activity. Economic activity will decline, except
insofar as the authorities become so concerned about it that the Europeans
break all the rules they have imposed on themselves, through the Stability
and Growth Pact’s constraints on ﬁscal policy and the European Central
Bank’s primary focus on price stability, and pursue an aggressively stim-
ulative policy.
I therefore see a big problem with substantial current account adjust-
ment, mainly for Europe but also for Japan. Both already have large budget
deﬁcits: the Japanese budget deﬁcit is roughly 7 percent of GDP, and France,
Germany, and Italy, the core of Europe, have ﬁscal deﬁcits expected to
exceed the 3 percent limit under the Pact.
Excess saving in these big rich countries manifests itself in budget
deﬁcits and current account surpluses. Savers directly or indirectly buy
claims on their governments or claims on foreigners. In my judgment, fur-
ther reductions in the long-term interest rate are not going to produce
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 127enough domestic investment to substitute for those two, particularly in the
face of a decline in competitiveness brought about through large appreci-
ations of the currency.
Japan and Germany are perhaps unusual because of their peculiar history
and their dependence on export performance. But I do not see how the
currency appreciations that the paper simulates will produce the changes
in saving required to eliminate, or even greatly reduce, the current account
surpluses of Asia and Europe. A decline in Asian and European output in
turn is likely to reduce the value of U.S. equity claims on those countries,
weakening and possibly even reversing the valuation effect arising from
dollar depreciation.
China is more complicated, and I will not discuss it in detail. Although I
do not subscribe to the whole of the Dooley-Garber thesis, I am sympathetic
to one of its main thrusts. China is a very-high-saving, high-investment
country. I believe there is a pent-up, latent demand in China for foreign
assets, which cannot be realized because violation of the foreign currency
rules, especially those regarding the export of resident funds, is severely
punished. China has a very weak capital market, and the central bank of
China is, in effect, making the foreign investments that the public is pre-
vented from making. Tighter ﬁscal policy, which might be called for at
the moment on domestic grounds, would actually increase national saving
in China. That moves in the wrong direction.
To conclude, I believe that the United States has comparative advantage
at producing marketable assets. We sell these marketable assets to the rest
of the world. As long as Americans use the proceeds of the sale of those
marketable assets productively—and that is an important qualiﬁcation,
bearing on the desirability of the ﬁscal deﬁcit—I do not see why that process
cannot go on indeﬁnitely.
I am not saying the U.S. current account deﬁcit will go on forever. My
crystal ball fades rapidly after ﬁfteen or twenty years. But, for the next
decade, I do not see why the process whereby the United States generates
marketable assets and sells them to foreigners who are eager to buy them can-
not continue on the current scale, that is, roughly half a trillion dollars a year.
Will there be a dollar crisis? I don’t have any idea. It depends in large
measure on how markets react to debates such as the one we are having
here. Expectations in ﬁnancial markets can be very fragile. Currency mar-
kets could start to run away rapidly from the dollar. My main point is that
there need not be a crisis.
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1 Had Yogi Berra, the great baseball player and savant,
been the discussant of this paper, he likely would have begun with his famous
words, “It is déjà vu all over again!” Fifteen years ago Stefan Gerlach and
Peter Petri published a collection of essays with a pompous title, The Eco-
nomics of the Dollar Cycle.
2 They viewed the movements of the external
value of the dollar as cyclical: having appreciated by more than 40 percent
between late 1979 and February 1985, the dollar had then collapsed to a
new low by 1987, only to stabilize and ﬂuctuate narrowly around the bottom
of the range experienced during the 1980s. Gerlach and Petri also made
the following astounding claim:
Unlike narrowly focused studies in a technical specialty, this book explores the
subject simultaneously from the viewpoints of exchange rate economics, empirical
trade analysis, the economics of international financial markets, and macro-
economic policy-making in the United States, Japan, Europe, and the developing
countries.3
Here we are, ﬁfteen years later, exploring the same issues, except that the
buzzword of that day—“newly industrializing countries” or NICs—has been
replaced by another, “emerging markets.” Evsey Domar, when asked by a
graduate student at MIT why the questions in the macroeconomics exam-
ination do not change from year to year, is said to have replied, “Ah—but
the answers do!” Domar did not claim that the answers got better over
time, but one can hope that the papers in this volume will provide better
answers to the same questions covered in the Gerlach-Petri volume.
In preparing this comment, I found particularly useful the contributions
to that volume by my late colleague James Tobin, and the comments on
Tobin’s paper by his Yale student Ralph Bryant and my dear departed friend
Rudiger Dornbusch. In 1988, as now, the U.S. current account was in deﬁcit,
albeit at a little more than 2 percent of GDP rather than 6 percent as now.
Then as now, the United States was running a fiscal deficit of around
3.7 percent of GDP, similar to today’s 4 percent.
4 In 1988 nominal inter-
est rates in the United States had fallen from the dizzy Volckerian heights
of over 19 percent in the early 1980s to a low of less than 7 percent and
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1. I thank Benjamin Friedman and Robert Solow for their comments.
2. Interestingly, some of the contributors to the Gerlach-Petri volume were participants
at this Brookings Panel meeting.
3. Gerlach and Petri (1990, p.2).
4. See the authors’ ﬁgure 4.had again begun to rise. Nominal rates again reached a low of around 1 per-
cent (in terms of the federal funds rate) in mid-2004 and again have begun
to rise.
On the ﬁnancing of the U.S. current account deﬁcit in those days, Tobin
remarked, “We are being warned incessantly that we depend on foreigners—
mainly Japanese banks, insurance companies and pension funds—to buy
US Treasury bonds and other dollar assets. . . . Should they decide not to
buy dollar securities, we are told, [the result] would be calamitous.”
5
Now, besides the Japanese, the ﬁnanciers are the Asian central banks, par-
ticularly those of China, India, and Korea. (Even then, as Dornbusch noted
in his comment, “Central banks rather than private savers have been ﬁnanc-
ing the US current account.”)
6 But the dire warnings are being repeated.
Then, as Dornbusch put it, there was a “sharp shift in trade with the NICs.
The United States has experienced a $60 billion shift in its manufactures
trade with these countries since 1980.”
7 Now China ﬁgures prominently
in U.S. and world manufacturing trade, not to mention the prominence of
India and other countries in services trade through offshoring. Related to
this shift in trade was the issue of the domestic price consequences of dol-
lar depreciation. To quote Tobin again, with any further depreciation of
the dollar, “certainly imports from Japan and Europe will be more costly
in dollars. So will imports from Asian ‘NICs’ if we induce them to let
their currencies rise against the dollar.”
8 Today the inducement takes the
form of a demand by the secretary of the Treasury of the United States that
the Chinese revalue their renminbi by at least 10 percent.
At that time some held that the dollar was correctly valued, and hence
there was no need for policy-induced corrections.
9 This view was ratio-
nalized in three ways. First was the J-curve story: the response of the
economy to the fall in the value of the dollar that had already taken place
had yet to manifest itself fully and would surely do so soon. Second, U.S.
current account deﬁcits can be ﬁnanced indeﬁnitely by selling U.S. assets,
since, in the portfolio of the rest of the world, the share of U.S. assets was
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5. Tobin (1990, p. 34).
6. Dornbusch (1990, p. 53).
7. Dornbusch (1990, p. 53).
8. Tobin (1990, p. 30, emphasis added).
9. In the Gerlach-Petri volume, these views are summarized by Dornbusch (1990, 
pp. 53–54).probably below its long-run equilibrium value. The contemporary version
of this argument holds that China (and probably other Asian countries,
including India, as well) undervalues its currency to sustain its export-led
growth, so as to provide employment to its huge stock of underemployed
labor. Until this stock is exhausted, undervaluation of its currency may
continue, with the result that any possible appreciation from capital inﬂows
is prevented by accumulation of reserves held in dollar-denominated
assets. This argument is forcefully put forward by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau,
and Garber.
10 Third, the United States can wipe out the value of dollar-
denominated assets held by the rest of the world through inﬂation. Then
as now, the question was raised whether whatever transitional adjustments
(policy induced or otherwise) would inevitably take place to restore the
dollar to its long-run equilibrium would be orderly and smooth (a soft
landing), or delayed such that, when they eventually do take place, they
would be abrupt and large (a hard landing).
Brookings also held a workshop in that earlier period, in January 1987,
to discuss these issues, just as it is doing now. Then, however, it assembled
a group of multicountry-macroeconometric modelers and gave them alter-
native, but commonly speciﬁed, scenarios for the future. Starting from the
common actual history of U.S. and foreign prices and exchange rates, the
modelers (ﬁve in all) were asked to investigate the causes of the burgeon-
ing external deﬁcit of the United States during 1980–86 and to study the
likely path of the deﬁcit for the period 1987–91.
Bryant, in his comment on Tobin’s paper in the Gerlach-Petri volume,
reported on his updating of the conclusions of that workshop. His qualita-
tive and quantitative ﬁndings regarding policy are not that much different
from those of Obstfeld and Rogoff in the paper under discussion here,
once one adjusts for differences in initial conditions. Brieﬂy, he found that,
ﬁrst, in the short run (that is, until 1989), it was plausible to expect a sub-
stantial reduction in the U.S. external deﬁcit.
11 Second, in the medium and
long run (1990 and after), the prospects were much less encouraging, with
the improvement in the constant-price deﬁcit leveling off after 1989 and
the current-price deﬁcit (the deﬁcit measured in nominal dollars) ceasing
to improve well before it reached an acceptably low level. Third, a fall in
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11. Bryant (1990, pp. 42–43).the dollar’s real exchange value can play a powerful role in reducing the
external deficit. Fourth, the deficit in nominal dollar terms was unlikely
to decline to an acceptable level ($30 billion to $40 billion, or around
0.75 percent of GDP—one-ﬁfth of its value in 1987) without either a some-
what further depreciation of the dollar or markedly slower growth in the
United States than abroad.
Bryant’s own estimate of the real dollar depreciation needed to bring the
deﬁcit down to an acceptable rate was between 7 percent and 15 percent;
he viewed a 20 percent depreciation as excessive. Obstfeld and Rogoff esti-
mate the depreciation in terms of the real trade-weighted exchange rate
required in order to eliminate the present U.S. deﬁcit of about 5 percent of
GDP to be between 19 and 28 percent, in a scenario in which Asia neither
adjusts its exchange rate nor reduces its current account surplus (see their
table 4). Bringing the deﬁcit down to 1 percent of GDP, or one-ﬁfth of its
initial value (if one can make a linear interpolation from the authors’ esti-
mates), would call for a dollar depreciation in the range of 15 to 22 per-
cent, very close to the estimate of 20 percent, for a similar proportional
reduction of the deﬁcit in 1987, that Bryant cited but found excessive.
Tobin’s contribution to the Gerlach-Petri volume is aptly titled, “Eight
Myths about the Dollar.” He encountered these myths regarding what
should be done to eliminate the U.S. external deﬁcit “all too often in con-
temporary public and, yes, professional discussion.”
12 In exploding the
myths, he also provided an analytical framework for thinking about poli-
cies for eliminating the deﬁcit. Some of the myths seem to be still going
around, and, more important, Tobin’s analytical framework remains rel-
evant today. I therefore brieﬂy summarize Tobin’s contribution in the
next section.
TOBIN’S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE EIGHT MYTHS. Unsurpris-
ingly, Tobin found that, “just as [Hicks’s] IS-LM [model], for all the hard
knocks it has received from theorists, remains a good general ﬁrst approx-
imation, so its international application, Mundell-Fleming, has been a
good guide.”
13 In the basic, two-country version of this model, there are
two goods, and each country specializes in producing and exporting part
of its output of one of the goods. There are two real assets, consisting of
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12. Tobin (1990, p. 28).
13. Tobin (1990, p. 28).the real money stocks of the two countries. Each country holds some of
the other country’s asset. The simplest way of incorporating a trade (or
current account) deﬁcit in equilibrium in this model is through a capital
transfer from one country to another that allows the receiving country to
spend more on the two goods than its income, by the amount of the transfer.
With one country’s good as the numeraire, the price of the second coun-
try’s good (that is, its relative price in terms of the ﬁrst country’s good) is
the real exchange rate in the model. Given the amount of the transfer in
numeraire terms, goods market equilibrium determines the real exchange
rate. The income of each country includes, besides the value of its goods
output, its asset income, which in this simple framework equals the inter-
est income on the part of its domestic real money stock held at home at its
domestic interest rate and the interest income (in numeraire terms) on the
foreign asset held by domestic residents at the foreign interest rate. Asset mar-
ket equilibrium requires that, given the portfolio choices (in which capital
transfers from one country to the other are incorporated), the demand for
each country’s asset equal its exogenous supply. With free capital mobility,
asset market equilibrium implies that the difference between the domestic
and the foreign interest rate satisﬁes the uncovered interest party condi-
tion: in other words, that it equals the rate of expected real depreciation.
Under perfect foresight (rational expectations) the expected rate of depre-
ciation is zero in equilibrium, so that the model solves for two prices: the
real exchange rate and the common interest rate.
Obviously, this real model cannot determine the nominal exchange rate
or any other nominal variables. Trivially, one could introduce nominal vari-
ables by viewing each country’s asset as its nominal currency stock. By
choosing units of measurement of the two goods such that the price of each
country’s good in its own currency is unity, nominal and real exchange
rates can be made to equal each other. Any other price normalization rule
will lead to a different nominal exchange rate corresponding to a given real
exchange rate, but has no consequence for the determination of equilibrium
real values.
Clearly, away from equilibrium and assuming away unwanted inventory
accumulation (for example, assuming that the two commodities are per-
ishable), the excess of expenditure over income by one country will equal
the capital transfer from the other country ex post—this is the identity by
which the current account deﬁcit is matched by an equivalent capital inﬂow.
However, the excess expenditure and the corresponding capital inﬂows
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out, from the ex post identities that national dissaving (the excess of expen-
diture over income or production) equals capital surplus in the balance of
payments, which in turn equals the current account deﬁcit, no causal rela-
tionship among the variables can be inferred.
14 Put another way, no infer-
ence about the policy or behavioral changes needed to restore equilibrium
can be drawn from ex post identities. Indeed, some of Tobin’s eight myths
illustrate this proposition very clearly.
Simply put, policies that claim to restore equilibrium in both markets
by operating only in one market cannot, in general, succeed. In other words,
both the real exchange rate and the interest rate will have to change to
restore equilibrium. Tobin’s ﬁrst myth, that “eliminating the federal budget
deﬁcit will automatically eliminate the deﬁcit in the U.S. external current
account,” and the second myth, its corollary, that “correction of the federal
budget would solve the problem of external imbalance without further
depreciation of the dollar,”
15 illustrate this proposition. I cannot resist
referring also to Tobin’s sixth myth: “depreciation will be counterproduc-
tive for the United States because it will cause recessions in Europe and
Japan and diminish their demands for US goods and services.”
16 As Tobin
rightly said, even an undergraduate should be ashamed to fall for the chain
of arguments that lead to this myth, yet “it has been advanced with straight
faces by high ﬁnancial ofﬁcials”
17—a statement that remains true today.
This palpably false reasoning follows, in effect, by reading causality from
ex post accounting identities. Myths three, four, ﬁve, and seven illustrate
other but similarly faulty reasoning. Myth eight, on the naïveté of faith in
macroeconomic policy coordination among major economies, lives on. At
every meeting of the governors of the International Monetary Fund or the
summit of the G-7 or G-8, such coordination for addressing “global
imbalances” is advocated. Tobin was right: attempts at coordination on a
possibly wrong policy can be very harmful, and such an event cannot be
ruled out as unlikely, given the differences among analysts as to what
constitutes the right policy in the ﬁrst place.
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14. McCulloch (1990).
15. Tobin (1990, pp. 28–29).
16. Tobin (1990, p. 33).
17. Tobin (1990, p. 33).THE OBSTFELD-ROGOFF CALIBRATED MODEL AND ITS SIMULATIONS. The
Obstfeld-Rogoff model is, in some aspects, a more elaborate version of
the basic real model described above, and less elaborate in others. Each
country produces two goods, an internationally traded and a nontraded good,
instead of one in the basic model; each country consumes three goods—
the traded good that it produces, that produced by the other country, and,
of course, its own nontraded good—instead of two. However, theirs is a
static endowment model: each country has an exogenously determined
endowment of its two goods; there is no production (and there are no factors
of production) or investment, only consumption and trade. There are no
factor or asset markets. Appearances to the contrary, in the Obstfeld-
Rogoff model nominal exchange rates, the currency denomination of assets
held by U.S. and foreign residents, their valuation, and interest rate effects
are all add-ons: they do not form part of the behavioral speciﬁcation of the
model. The model determines the equilibrium real exchange rates from
which Obstfeld and Rogoff then derive nominal exchange rates under alter-
native assumptions of the policy objectives of the central bank: to stabilize
the CPI deflator, the GDP deflator, or a bilateral exchange rate. These
assumptions, being unrelated to the behavioral variables of the model,
do not inﬂuence its equilibrium determination. Investment decisions, inter-
est rates, and portfolio choices obviously do not arise in an endowments
model. Obstfeld and Rogoff add the return from net asset holdings at an
exogenously speciﬁed interest rate to the value of endowment on the income
side. Although asset valuation effects and interest rates do influence the
equilibrium through their income effects, they are still add-ons, since
gross values of assets and liabilities, portfolio weights, and interest rates
are not endogenously determined by the model, and the fact that gross
values are in nominal terms does not matter, since nominal exchange rates
are mechanically linked to real rates, given the assumed behavior of the
central bank.
When I say that add-on assumptions are not part of the behavioral struc-
ture model, I do not mean to imply that the results of the authors’ numer-
ical simulations, such as the magnitudes for nominal exchange rates, are not
plausible. They might well be, but their plausibility or otherwise cannot be
inferred from the plausibility of the assumptions alone. I will not, therefore,
comment on the paper’s numerical results.
Obstfeld and Rogoff simulate the impact of speciﬁed changes in the inter-
national pattern of external imbalances, those changes being the consequence
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to bring down initial current account deﬁcits and surpluses in all three
regions to zero. In another the U.S. current account is set at zero, Asia pegs
its nominal exchange rate to the dollar, and so on. The model then deter-
mines the comparative-static changes in equilibrium real exchange rates and
other endogenous variables associated with the change in external imbal-
ances. Since, in an endowment model, the only way to inﬂuence international
balances is by affecting demand, analysis of changes in international balances
brought about through shocks to supply, investment, or saving behavior is
ruled out.
Policies are not explicitly modeled—they are whatever is needed to
induce the unspeciﬁed shocks to demand. For example, all ﬁscal policy
combinations that, through shocks to consumption, result in the speciﬁed
changes in external imbalances are equivalent from the perspective of the
model. The focus of the analysis is entirely on the real exchange rate impli-
cations of the speciﬁed changes in the pattern of initial external imbalances,
and not on the policies that are behind those changes in imbalances. Those
policy changes are outside the model and cannot be evaluated through the
model. Thus the various policy proposals currently being made, including
a policy of neglect, benign or otherwise, of the initial imbalances, cannot
be evaluated. Also, the policy-relevant question of whether the prevailing
U.S. current account deﬁcit of 6 percent of GDP is indeﬁnitely sustainable
cannot be meaningfully posed, let alone answered, by the model. The
implications for U.S. interest rates of a shift away from dollar-denominated
assets in the portfolios of foreigners, including central banks, or a reduc-
tion in saving propensities abroad, or a rise in saving propensities in the
United States, cannot be examined. Such questions as whether the end to
global imbalances will come smoothly, predictably, and at a modest cost,
or abruptly, unexpectedly, and at a heavy cost, cannot be analyzed either.
The analytics of the model are easily illustrated in a slightly simpler
version in which there are two countries, home and foreign, each producing
two traded goods. Each traded good produced by one country is a perfect
substitute for the corresponding good produced by the other country. This
simpliﬁcation, of course, rules out home bias, as in the Obstfeld-Rogoff
model, in the consumption of traded goods, and it rules out having more
than one real exchange rate. However, it goes beyond the Obstfeld-Rogoff
model by allowing a production (supply) response to changes in relative
prices. Allowing both demand and supply responses to changes in global
136 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005balances will, in general, attenuate the change in relative prices required
to restore equilibrium. By distinguishing the short from the long run, such
that ﬂexibility to shift resources from producing one good to producing
the other is limited in the short run relative to the long run, one can allow
for possible overshooting in equilibrium relative prices in the short run
without having to appeal to price rigidities. The model collapses to the
endowment model if there is complete inﬂexibility in the short run. In a
special case of the model, there is no change in the equilibrium real
exchange rate from its initial value as the economy adjusts to the elimina-
tion of the trade deﬁcit.
The model is static, and there are no investment or capital ﬂows. The
current account deﬁcit is modeled as a pure income transfer from one
country to the other. For simplicity, preferences over three commodities
(the two traded goods and the nontraded good) in each country are assumed
to be homothetic. For simplicity, assume that the economy running a trade
deﬁcit ﬁnanced by an income transfer is a small open economy trading
with a large rest of the world, so that it is a price taker in the world market
for its traded goods. (This is the so-called dependent economy of W. Salter
and T. Swan,
18 in which the relative price of one traded good in terms of
the other is set by the world market.) This means that the two traded goods
can be aggregated into a single composite traded good for the small open
economy, as long as conditions in the world market do not change.
Suppose there are two factors of production (say, capital and labor), and
suppose the technology of production of all three goods exhibits constant
returns to scale and factor intensity (capital-labor ratio) nonreversal, so
that the ranking of the goods in terms of cost-minimizing factor intensities
is independent of factor prices. Then, given the relative price of traded
goods, the factor prices can be uniquely solved from the two expressions
equating price to unit cost, if both goods are produced in positive amounts.
Given the unique factor prices, the minimum unit cost of production of
the nontraded good and hence its price, given that a positive amount of it
is produced, are determined. Suppose the factor endowments are such that
the production possibility frontier (PPF) includes a nonempty subset S in
which all three goods are produced in positive amounts. In S the marginal
rate of transformation between the traded composite good (T) and the
nontraded good is constant.
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In ﬁgure 1 above, the PPF is depicted as ABC, where the linear stretch AB
(except at points A and B) corresponds to S. The consumption possibility
frontier (CPF), given a transfer AD (in units of the traded composite good)
from the rest of the world, is depicted by DEFC. It is simply a vertical
shift of the PPF by the distance AD. Assume that preferences are represented
by a homothetic, quasi-concave utility function. Maximizing utility subject
to the CPF leads to the initial equilibrium consumption at Q0 and production
at P0 vertically below it. At Q0 an indifference curve touches the PPF so that
the common slope of the two is the slope of DE, which equals the relative
price of the traded composite good, that is, the real exchange rate.
Suppose now that the transfer is withdrawn so that the CPF coincides with
the PPF. If the real exchange rate does not change, by virtue of homothetic
preferences, consumption shifts to Q′ 0 on AB, where the ray OQ0 from the
origin intersects AB. If production remains at P0, there will be an excess
supply of the nontraded good. However, since the marginal rate of trans-
formation between traded and nontraded goods is constant along AB, the
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Figure 1. Small Open Economy Modelproduction point shifts to Q′ 0 and the excess supply is eliminated. Thus the
economy adjusts to the elimination of the trade deﬁcit by a pure quantity
adjustment with no change in the real exchange rate.
One could depict an endowment economy by reinterpreting the PPF as
just a single point P0. With income transfer P0Q0, the economy consumes
at Q0. Let DE be the tangent to the indifference curve at Q0, so that it is
the real exchange rate from a consumption perspective. The withdrawal
of the transfers requires that the consumption point move to P0. But if
the consumption real exchange rate does change, it will move to Q′ 0,
once again creating an excess demand for traded goods. To eliminate this
excess demand, the real exchange rate for consumption has to change to the
slope of the indifference curve through P0. This means (under the standard
assumption of convexity of preferences and both goods being normal)
there has to be a rise in the relative price of the traded good in terms of the
nontraded good, or a real depreciation, since at P0 and Q0 the consumption
of the nontraded good is the same, whereas that of the traded good com-
posite is lower at P0.
Returning to the production economy, what if the initial consumption
point is on EF, such as Q1? By construction, because each point on EF is
at the same vertical distance (of AD) above the point on the stretch BC ver-
tically below it, the slope of the CPF at Q1 is the same as the slope of the
PPF at P1, and their common slope is equal to the equilibrium real exchange
rate from both a consumption and a production perspective. Now, with the
withdrawal of the income transfer, the CPF coincides with the PPF, and
production will remain at P1. At unchanged real exchange rates, consump-
tion will move to a point (not shown) to the left of P1 on the straight line that
is tangent to the PPF at P1, thus creating excess demand for traded goods.
To eliminate this excess demand, a real depreciation has to occur, with the
new equilibrium point lying to the left of P1 on the PPF, where an indif-
ference curve touches the PPF (not shown).
Short-run inﬂexibility and long-run ﬂexibility in shifting resources start-
ing from the production point P1 can be easily illustrated. The short-run
PPF touches the long-run PPF at the initial production point P1 but is
below it otherwise, with the vertical distance between the two increasing as
the production of the nontraded good increasingly deviates from its level
at P1 in either direction. Under these assumptions, which seem natural for
depicting short-run inﬂexibility, it is clear that the short-run equilibrium
point where an indifference curve touches the short-run PPF will imply a
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value at the point where an indifference curve touches the long-run PPF.
In other words there is overshooting of the real exchange rate in the short
run. If we add on a dynamic adjustment of the short-run PPF to the long-run
PPF over time, it follows that, after overshooting, the real exchange rate
will converge to its long-run value.
The essential features of the adjustment will remain in its extension to a
multicountry general equilibrium setup. However, its diagrammatic expo-
sition will not. The reason is that the convenient device of a Hicksian com-
posite traded good depends on the relative price of traded goods not changing.
This cannot hold in general in the general equilibrium setup, because the
relative prices are endogenous. Although the Obstfeld-Rogoff model is a
three-country general equilibrium model, it replicates the essential quali-
tative conclusion of adjustment in a small open economy, namely, that a
real depreciation is generally (though not necessarily always) needed to
eliminate global imbalances.
For their purpose, which is to arrive at a quantitative estimate of the extent
of the real depreciation needed to eliminate global imbalances, Obstfeld and
Rogoff have had to calibrate their general equilibrium model. Let me there-
fore conclude with a couple of comments on the calibration.
19 Obstfeld and
Rogoff relate their choice of values for the two crucial parameters, θ (the
elasticity of substitution in consumption between the traded aggregate and
the nontraded good) and η (the so-called Armington elasticity of substitu-
tion between the domestic and foreign traded goods in the traded goods
aggregate), to econometric estimates in the literature. There are several
problems with this procedure. First, although θ is arguably a “deep” param-
eter in the Lucas sense, since it relates to preferences, η is not. As such,
any estimate of η will depend on the trade policy regime and therefore
cannot be stably estimated econometrically. Second, setting aside the policy
dependence of parameter values, since the Obstfeld-Rogoff model involves
aggregates, alternative schemes of aggregation will inﬂuence parameter
values, and whether the estimates in the literature are all comparable and
correspond to the implied aggregation of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model is not
obvious. To be fair, the authors are certainly aware of these issues, and
their simulations cover a range of values for the two parameters. Perhaps
they should cover an even broader range of values, particularly for η.
140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005
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ductivity’s effect on the trade deﬁcit depends critically on whether the
change in productivity occurs in the traded goods or the nontraded goods
sector. He reported his own recent ﬁndings showing that, whereas the pro-
ductivity slowdown in the United States during the 1970s had occurred in
both sectors, the acceleration of the 1990s was mainly in traded goods.
Although some estimates attribute almost all the acceleration to comput-
ers and associated industries, Nordhaus estimated that only somewhere
between a half and two-thirds came from that source. The most recent
data also suggest that productivity has accelerated, but he cautioned that
this may in part reﬂect mismeasurement of productivity in the retail sec-
tor. Noting that Jack Triplett had found the United States to be on the
frontier of improved measurement techniques that have tended to raise
estimates of productivity growth, Nordhaus speculated that Europe’s pro-
ductivity performance might look more like the United States’ if the same
measurement techniques were used for both.
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti noted that the April 2005 issue of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) contains a
paper using a four-region global economic model that is similar to the
authors’ three-region model but allows for changes in production. As one
would expect, the WEO model ﬁnds that allowing for a production response
leads to a smaller, but still quite substantial, real depreciation of the dollar.
Sebastian Edwards observed that, in the authors’ Bretton Woods II sce-
nario, Asia’s surplus increases from 15 percent of U.S. traded-goods GDP
to 25 percent. The authors’ real model is unable to consider the monetary
consequences of this increase, but Edwards suggested that in the real world
it would create enormous pressure to expand the money supply in China
and the other Asian countries, requiring an extraordinary amount of steril-
ization to avoid inﬂation. Indeed, the latest data already show an increase
in inﬂation in China. Edwards also observed that the results of the authors’
global rebalancing scenario do not differ significantly from those of an
earlier two-region model of theirs; the introduction of the third region does
not appear to make a signiﬁcant difference to the results.
Edmund Phelps reminded the panel of a paper he had co-written in 1986,
which argued that the expansionary U.S. ﬁscal policy of that era would
result in a boom in the United States while causing world real interest
rates to increase, leading to a recession in Europe. This analysis suggests
that if the United States were now to adopt ﬁscal austerity, world real interest
Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth S. Rogoff 141rates would decrease. This in turn would likely lead to an increase in asset
values in Europe and Asia, and thus an increase, rather than a decrease as
Richard Cooper had predicted in his comment, in output in those countries.
In the United States the shadow prices of business assets would fall, causing
a decline in production and investment.
Peter Garber argued that although Japan’s and Germany’s populations
are aging, and their populations growing slowly, there is signiﬁcant under-
employment in their economies, especially in the nontradable services
industries. Underemployment is the reason that Japan has dramatically
increased its monetary base in order to maintain a high yen-dollar exchange
rate. Garber suggested that Germany is facing the same problem but is
incapable of making a similar intervention, and its difﬁculties are exerting
pressure on the European Central Bank to lower interest rates.
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